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The choice of forum in international litigation-which country's courts
will hear the dispute--can be outcome determinative. This article discusses
four doctrines by which a party may influence the choice of forum in
international litigation: Forum non conveniens; Parallel Proceedings; Motions
to Stay or Dismiss U.S. Proceedings in Favor of Parallel Foreign Proceedings;
and Antisuit Injunctions. The brief introduction that follows in Section I sets
forth the context in which these doctrines operate.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. International Litigation and Choice of Forum
1. Multiple Fora
In the absence of an exclusive forum selection clause in an international
contract, an international dispute-by its very nature-could likely be
commenced in more than one forum.
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a. For example, if a U.S. corporation manufactures a product that
injures someone in Scotland, that company is likely to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in both the U.S. and Scotland.
b. If a Japanese company enters into a distribution agreement with
a U.S. company, in the event of a dispute, the Japanese
company may well be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
courts of both the U.S. and Japan.
2. Perceived Advantages of a U.S. Forum
In situations where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction both in
the U.S. and another country, a plaintiff--even a non-U.S. plaintiff-may well
choose to bring suit in the U.S.
a. As one English judge, Lord Denning, said: "As a moth is drawn
to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."'
b. This is because certain features of the U.S. legal system are
perceived to favor plaintiffs, including the following:
i. The availability of contingent-fee lawyers in the U.S.
ii. The availability of punitive or multiple damages awards.
iii. The availability ofjury trials in civil cases.
iv. The availability of broader discovery.
v. The absence of rules making an unsuccessful party liable
for the attorneys' fees and costs of the successful party.
vi. The availability of causes of action that simply do not
exist in other countries, like under RICO, the antitrust
laws or the securities laws.
vii. The possibility of class action suits.
c. As a corollary, a U.S. forum is often perceived to be
unfavorable to defendants. Thus defendants, relying on various
doctrines and strategies, go to great lengths to avoid suits in the
U.S.
d. Some defendants go so far as to stipulate that they will not
contest liability in a foreign forum if the U.S. suit against them
is dismissed.2
Representatives of the deceased French domiciliaries brought suit against
Boeing and TWA in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
I. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, at 730.
2. For example, In re Air Crash offLong Island, New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
arose out of the crash of TWA Flight 800 on July 17, 1996 shortly after it took off from New York's John F.
Kennedy Airport for Paris and Rome.
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Boeing and TWA made a motion to dismiss the suit on grounds offorum non
conveniens in favor of a French forum, predicated on a conditional promise,
among other things, not to contest liability for full compensatory damages in the
courts of France and promptly to pay any damages awarded. Presumably,
defendants believed France to be a more favorable forum because it neither
recognizes punitive damages nor permits contingency fee representation.
Notwithstanding defendants' conditional promise, the court denied the
defendants' motion. The court noted in this context:
If Defendants were not willing not to contest liability as to compensatory
damages, this motion would not require serious consideration. It would not be
necessary to consider the public interest factors, because the private interest
factors would themselves weigh heavily against dismissal. Defendants'
willingness not to contest liability makes dismissal a closer issue. Nevertheless,
an exception is not warranted here.'
e. The U.S. is not always the most favorable forum for a plaintiff
and, when faced with an international dispute, it is important to
consider carefully the advantages and disadvantages of choosing
one forum over another. England, for example, is a favorable
forum for defamation actions.
f. Moreover, in the event that a dispute involves a relatively
modest amount, a foreign plaintiff might be better off in its
home courts than have to incur the additional expense inevitably
involved in litigating in another country.
3. Forum Shopping
When a party to an international dispute commences suit in a forum it
believes to be favorable to its case, such party is often accused of forum
shopping. But, as another English judge, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, has pointed
out, "forum shopping is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying
that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice ofjurisdiction, he will naturally choose the
one in which he thinks his case can be most favorably presented: this should
be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation."4
B. Strategies for Selecting or Avoiding a Forum
1. Introduction
Because the choice of forum in international litigation can be outcome
determinative, a party involved in an international dispute needs to be aware of
3. Id. at 218.
4. The Atlantic Star, [ 19741 A.C. 436, at 471.
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various strategies and doctrines which can affect the location of the forum in
which the case is heard. Some of these strategies and doctrines can often be
employed simultaneously.
2. Exclusive Forum Selection Clauses
One strategy is to choose the forum before any dispute arises. This can be
done by including an exclusive forum selection clause in a contract. An
exclusive clause-as its name suggests-means that a suit can be brought only
in the forum designated in the contract. By contrast, a non-exclusive clause
permits, but does not require, a suit to be brought in a particular forum.
Obviously, whether a party can insist that its home forum is designated in an
exclusive forum selection clause turns on its bargaining power during
negotiations or how strongly the other party views the issue.
In fact, one of the reasons that parties to international contracts often agree
to resolve their disputes by arbitration is to have a "neutral forum" for the
dispute, rather than the home court of one or other party.
A forum selection clause, by its very nature, operates only where the dis-
puting parties have a contractual relationship, although the clause, if appro-
priately drafted, can include within its scope any tortious disputes that may
arise out of that relationship--e.g., a claim that the contract was fraudulently
induced.5 Where there is no contractual relationship between the disputing
parties, however, then, ex hypothesi, there will be no forum selection clause
governing where suit must be brought. Thus, where a dispute arises in circum-
stances where either the disputing parties did not include an exclusive forum
selection clause in their contract, or the dispute does not relate to or arise out
of any such contract, then the parties must resort to various other strategies to
influence the location of the forum in which the case is resolved.
3. Races to the Court House and Actions for Negative Declarations
In the absence of an exclusive forum selection clause, one common
strategy for choosing the forum is to be the first to file suit.
a. A prospective defendant does not have wait for the allegedly
injured party-the prospective plaintiff-to commence suit.
The prospective defendant can launch a pre-emptive strike: it
can bring an action in its own favored forum for a negative
declaration-a declaration that it is not liable to the injured
party (now the defendant) for a particular claim. This strategy
works only if the law of the favored forum recognizes actions
5. Appendix A contains some draft forum selection and related clauses.
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for negative declarations. Generally, such actions are
recognized in both common law and civil law countries.
Although, as Lawrence Collins has noted, "[i]n England, there
has been some hostility to actions for negative declarations."
b. For more information, see Andreas Lowenfeld's article, Forum
Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and
Related Tools of International Litigation.7
Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd. is a recent illustration of an
unsuccessful attempt at an action for declaratory relief brought as a pre-emptive
strike. The case arose out of a press release issued by Harrods intended as an
April Fool's joke. The press release related to plans to "float" Harrods. The
joke played on the word "float," suggesting that Harrods intended to build a
floating version of its store. This release was later run by the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) which commented on the joke in a story entitled "The Enron of
Britain," stating that: "If Harrods, The British retailer, goes public, investors
would be wise to question its every disclosure." Harrods claimed that this
constituted libel and demanded an apology backed by the threat of litigation.
On May 24, 2002, Dow Jones brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking (i) relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA), asking the court to declare that any libel action based on
the WSJ article would be insufficient as a matter of law; and (ii) an anti-suit
injunction enjoining Harrods and Al-Fayed, its owner, from pursuing any
litigation related to the article. On May 29, 2002, Harrods commenced suit in
the High Court of Justice in London seeking damages for libel. The reason for
Dow Jones' preemptive strike is that England is a far more favorable forum for
libel actions than the U.S.
Harrods moved to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the DJA. Harrods advanced three grounds:
(i) declaratory judgment relief was not the proper mechanism to
resolve tort claims;
(ii) Dow Jones' action was a forum-shopping pre-emptive strike
brought against the "natural plaintiff," and such a suit is outside
of the purposes contemplated for the use of the DJA; and
(iii) there was no "actual controversy" within the terms of the DJA.
6. Lawrence Collins, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 276
(OUP 1994).
7. Andreas Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, andRelated
Tools ofInternational Litigation, 91 Am. J. Int. L. 314 (1997).
8. 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aft'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cit. 2003).
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In a lengthy and wide-ranging opinion, Judge Marrero granted Harrods'
motion to dismiss. While it is difficult to cover all the issues addressed in the
court's lengthy opinion, three points are worth noting.
First, the district court found there was no "actual controversy" for the
purposes of the DJA. Dow Jones had argued that there was an "actual
controversy" on the ground that any judgment obtained in England would not
be enforceable in the United States because it would violate the First
Amendment. The court rejected this argument, stating that it was based on
"premature concerns about contingencies that may or may not come to pass."9
Even if Dow Jones' theory that ajudgment against it in the London Action
would be unenforceable in most or all American jurisdictions were conceded,
it does not follow that the mere prospect that such a ruling may be rendered at
some indefinite point in the future raises a sufficient actual controversy within
the meaning of the DJA. The Court does not find enough immediacy and
reality in Dow Jones' claim at this early stage of the London Action to warrant
declaratory relief. In essence, Dow Jones' complaint is grounded on a string of
apprehensions and conjectures about future possibilities: that the court in the
London Action will find a basis to assert jurisdiction and will recognize the
pleading of a sufficient claim; that an adverse ruling on the merits may be
rendered against Dow Jones; that the adjudication may award Harrods
compensatory damages or enjoin Dow Jones from publishing the April 5
Article; that Dow Jones may seek to enforce such judgment in the United States
or elsewhere; that if enforcement is sought, the judgment will be recognized
somewhere. At this juncture, however, these protestations and prospects
amount to nothing more than what they still are: premature concerns about
contingencies that may or may not come to pass.' 0
Second, in support of its argument, Dow Jones also cited cases where
federal courts had granted declaratory or injunctive relief enjoining parallel
state court proceedings where fundamental constitutional rights, such as those
under the First Amendment, were at stake. The district court was careful to
distinguish these cases from the case before it, finding that different
considerations applied in international cases. The court stated:
Thus, under Dow Jones' hypothesis, the DJA would confer upon an
American court a preemptive style of global jurisdiction branching worldwide
and able to strike down offending litigation anywhere on Earth. Intriguing as
such universal power might appear to any judge, this Court must take a more
modest view of the limits of itsjurisdiction, and offers a more humble response
to the invitation and temptation to overreach."
9. Id.
10. Dow Jones, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
11. Id. at 41!.
[Vol. 14:2
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Third, the district court also considered whether it would exercise its
discretion to issue declaratory relief even if it were to have found an actual
controversy. In addressing this question, the court found significant that Dow
Jones filed its action as a preemptive strike, and stated that this weighed against
the granting of declaratory relief:
Dow Jones' litigation in this Court amounts to strategic forum-shopping
motivated by pursuit of tactical edge over an opponent. In essence, it seeks to
establish venue here and away from anotherjurisdiction where the action could
properly be brought, and to haul foreign parties into this Court for an
application of American law in support of a declaration of non-liability
shielding Dow Jones from damages for prior conduct. That in this race to the
courthouse Dow Jones managed to file its declaratory action first is
immaterial. 2
Being the first to file suit is not dispositive. (Although, as set forth below,
it is a factor considered under U.S. law on a motion to dismiss or stay on
grounds that there is a parallel foreign proceeding.) A defendant may rely on
certain strategies and doctrines in isolation or combination to defeat a plaintiff's
choice of forum, and a plaintiff to defend its choice of forum:
i. Motion To Dismiss on Grounds of Forum non conveniens;
ii. The Commencement of Parallel Proceedings;
iii. Motion To Stay or Dismiss On Grounds of Parallel Foreign
Proceeding; and
iv. Anti-Suit Injunctions.
The following sections consider U.S. law relating to each of these
doctrines.
II. FORUM NON CONVENENS
A. Basic Principles of US. Law
1. Introduction
As the United States Supreme Court stated in the leading case of GulfOil
Corp. v. Gilbert, "[i]n all cases in which the doctrine offorum non conveniens
comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them."' 3
(italics omitted.)
12. Id. at 440.
13. GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
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2. Presumption In Favor Of Plaintiff's Choice Of Forum
The starting point for an analysis of the doctrine offorum non conveniens
is that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice
of forum that should "rarely be disturbed."'
14
3. Two-Pronged Test
In addressing a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, a
court has to examine:
a. The availability of an alternative forum to adjudicate the
dispute.
b. If an adequate alternative forum exists, the court will then
balance the public and private interests to determine whether the
convenience of the parties and the ends ofjustice would best be
served by dismissing the action in favor of the alternative
forum. '
4. Discretion
Because the test is so fact-intensive, theforum non conveniens analysis is
largely within the discretion of the district court.
a. "[T]he decision lies wholly within the broad discretion of the
district court and should be reversed only if that discretion has
been clearly abused."'"
b. "Discretion is abused in the context of forum non conveniens
when a decision (1) rests either on an error of law or on a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, or (2) cannot be located within
the range of permissible decisions .... or (3) fails to consider all
the relevant factors or unreasonably balances those factors."' 7
14. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
15. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508-509.
16. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,491 (2d
Cir. 1998) (limited but "meaningfil" appellate review).
17. Pollux Holding, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2003).
[Vol. 14:2
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5. Applicability To Actions To Confirm International Arbitration Awards
The Second Circuit recently held that an action for the recognition and




As noted above, the first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis
requires a determination of whether an alternative forum is available to hear the
dispute.
a. An alternative forum is said to be "available" if the defendant is
amenable to process in another jurisdiction, except in those
"rare circumstances... where the remedy offered by the other
forum is clearly unsatisfactory."' 9
b. To be available, a forum must permit the "litigation of the
subject matter of the dispute."2 Thus, an adequate forum does
not exist if a statute of limitations bars the bringing of the case
in that forum.2 Courts often deal with statute of limitations
issues by making conditional dismissals.22
c. One common argument made by a non-U.S. plaintiff in
opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds is that even though the defendant is
amenable to process in a non-U.S. forum, that forum is not
"available" because it is inadequate.
2. Two-Step Inquiry
Accordingly, some courts have further broken down this prong into a two-
step inquiry:
a. the party moving for dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds must be amenable to jurisdiction in another forum, and
b. the other forum must satisfy certain minimal standards of
adequacy.
18. InreMonigasquedeReassurancesS.A.M v. NakNaftogaz of Ukraineetal., 311 F.3d488 (2d
Cir. 2002). For a discussion of this decision, see William W. Park, The International Currency ofArbitral
Awards, (PLI Coursebook 2004).
19. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
20. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
21. BCCI v. State Bank of Pakistan, 273 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
22. ' See Point G below.
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C. Availability ofAlternative Forum
1. Introduction
In order to satisfy this requirement, the foreign court must have
jurisdiction over all the defendants, notjust the "primary" defendants.23 Where
a defendant is considered to be "not essential," however, the fact that he is not
amenable to jurisdiction in the foreign forum will not preclude dismissal on
grounds offorum non conveniens.24
2. Effect of Legislation in Some Latin American Countries
a. Some Latin American countries have passed statutes which
affect theforum non conveniens analysis by U.S. courts.25
b. The Guatemalan statute is illustrative. It provides that once a
Guatemalan national files a suit in the U.S. on a particular
claim, then the courts of Guatemala cease to have subject matter
jurisdiction over that claim. In such a case, the Guatemalan
national can argue that the Guatemalan forum is unavailable for
the purposes of the U.S.forum non conveniens analysis.
c. The purpose of these laws is to prevent U.S. defendants from
obtaining dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens of a
case brought in a U.S. court by a national of those Latin
American countries.
d. U.S. courts have generally rejected arguments based on these
statutes. In Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co.,26 the court considered
an argument against dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds
advanced by a Guatemalan citizen who had brought suit in the
U.S. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court stated:
Plaintiff argues that Guatemalan law forbids disturbing a
plaintiff's forum choice. Consequently, Guatemalan courts will
not recognize jurisdiction that has been "manipulated" by a
forum non conveniens transfer. However, a quick and decisive
solution to this potential problem was reached in Delgado v.
Shell Oil, 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1375 (S.D.Tex. 1995). After
23. Madanesv. Madanes,981 F.Supp.241,265-66(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding thatdismissalofsuit
would be improper "absent a proffer by all of the Defendants that they would be willing to consent to the
jurisdiction of the Argentine court .. "). See also Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown
Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
24. Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 293 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996).
25. See, e.g., Decreto Numero 34-97 (1997) (Guatemala); Ley de Defensa de Derechos Procesalas
de Nacionales y Residentes (Law in Defense of the Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents)
(Honduras); Ley 55 (Ecuador).
26. 941 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1996).
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finding Guatemala and other fora to be adequate to meritforum
non conveniens dismissal, the court directed that "in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction" of any plaintiff's case, that
plaintiff may return, and the court will resume jurisdiction.27
e. In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,28 plaintiff opposed a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds by relying on
Ecuadorian Law 55. Law 55 provides in part: "Should the
lawsuit be filed outside Ecuadorian territory, this will definitely
terminate national competency as well as any jurisdiction of
Ecuadorian judges over the matter."
Plaintiffs argued that Ecuador was not an available
alternative forum on the ground that, under Law 55, Ecuadorian
courts had no jurisdiction.
Judge Rakoff rejected this argument because it "relied on
two doubtful assumptions. '29 The first is that Law 55 is retro-
active (Law 55 was enacted in 1998, and the suit in question
was filed in the U.S. prior to 1998.) The second assumption is
that Law 55 applies even after a case is dismissed on grounds of
forum non conveniens. Judge Rakoff found that "[w]hile the
Ecuadorian courts have yet to resolve these issues .... the
unlikelihood that Ecuadorian courts would ultimately adopt both
these dubious assumptions makes Law 55 an insufficient basis
for concluding that the Ecuadorian forum is unavailable."3
Judge Rakoff qualified the dismissal of the case, however:
Nevertheless, as a safeguard, this Court ... will qualify the dismissals
here to provide that in the event that a court of last review in Ecuador
finally affirms the dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction pursuant to Law
55 of any action raising the claims here at issue pursued in good faith
in Ecuador by any of the plaintiffs here, this Court, upon motion made
within 60 days, will resume jurisdiction over that action.3
The Second Circuit agreed with this reasoning and noted
that, since the district court's decision, the Ecuadorian Constitu-
tional Court had declared Law 55 to be unconstitutional.3 2
27. Id. at 1525.
28. 142 F. Supp.2d 534, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affidas modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
29. Id. at 546.
30. Id. at 547.
31. Id. at 547.
32. 303 F.3d at 477.
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D. Adequacy OfAlternative Forum
1. Burden to Show Adequate Forum
It is the moving party's burden to demonstrate the existence of an adequate
alternative forum.33
2. Bases for Claiming Inadequacy
There are three different bases for claiming that a forum is inadequate: (a)
the substantive law of the alternative forum is inadequate; (b) the procedures
of the alternative forum are inadequate; or (c) the political or social circum-
stances in the alternative forum are such as to render it inadequate.
3. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Substantive Law
a. The fact that the substantive law of the foreign forum differs
from that of the U.S. "should ordinarily not be given conclusive
or even substantial weight"34 , and "[t]he availability of an
adequate alternative forum does not depend on the existence of
an identical cause of action in the other forum."35
b. Although the courts are not always in agreement, most courts
have granted motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens notwithstanding the fact that foreign law does not
provide the same remedy as that available under U.S. law, as
long as there is some remedy under foreign law.
c. Set forth below are some arguments considered by the courts in
considering whether a forum is inadequate on the ground its
substantive law differs from the U.S.:
i. RICO Claims. Because plaintiffs can still bring foreign
suits based on the underlying predicate acts, RICO suits
are subject to forum non conveniens dismissal. 6
ii. Antitrust Suits. The Circuits are divided on whether the
doctrine offorum non conveniens is applicable to antitrust
33. BCCI v. State Bank of Pakistan, 273 F.3d 241,248 (2d Cir. 2001).
34. Id. at 247.
35. PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
36. Lockman Found v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1991); PT
United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 74; Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) ("A review of the legislative history of RICO ... discloses no mandate that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should not apply .... ). See also In reAir Crash offLong Island, New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Because the traditional Gilbert public
interest factors weigh heavily in favor of France, we do not agree that the United States' interest in applying
'its securities and RICO laws rendered Judge McKenna's decision to dismiss on the grounds of forum non
conveniens an abuse of discretion.").
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cases. The Fifth Circuit has reasoned that absent the
antitrust claim, there may not be an alternate remedy
available to a plaintiff and therefore, these claims should
not be subject to forum non conveniens dismissal."
iii. Securities Law. Courts have held that claims based on
U.S. securities laws are subject to forum non conveniens
dismissal. 8
iv. Copyright Law. Copyright suits have been dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds, as most countries have
their own copyright laws available as a potential remedy.
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the Singapore
Copyright Act provided an adequate alternative remedy to
the U.S. Copyright Act, even though its territorial limita-
tions reduced the scope of relief available.39
4. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Procedural Differences
a. The fact that a foreign forum has different procedures to a U.S.
forum will rarely render it inadequate. If all a plaintiff had to do
was demonstrate that the foreign court had less favorable
procedures than that of a U.S. court, as a practical matter almost
every foreign forum would be found to be inadequate.
b. Set forth below are some of the arguments considered by courts
in assessing whether a foreign forum is inadequate on
procedural grounds:
i. Availability of Jury Trial. The fact that a foreign forum
does not have jury trials does not render it inadequate.4"
37. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated by 460 U.S. 1007
(1983). But cf Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat "l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[A]ntitrust suits are subject to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine."). See also CSR
Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 484 (D.N.J. 2001).
38. See e.g.,Howev. GoldcorpInv., Ltd., 946 F.2d944,950(1stCir. 1991), cert. denied, 502U.S.
1095 (1992); Alfadda v. Fenn, 966 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1998); But
see Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand, 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (D.N.J. 1996) (Canada was not adequate
alternative forum for securities class action suit based on U.S. securities laws, noting that the U.S. "has a
strong public policy of protecting the integrity of its securities markets").
39. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech System Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1995). See also
Deston Songs LLC v. Wingspan Records, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2001). But see
Jose Armando Bermudez & Co. v. Bermudez Int'l, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12354, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000)
(declining to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds where plaintiff asserted trademark and copyright
infringement claims).
40. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195,199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987); Lockman Found, 930 F.2d at 768.
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ii. Discovery. While most countries do not have the broad
scope of discovery available in the U.S., this will not
render a foreign forum inadequate.4'
iii. Contingent Fee Arrangements. In Murray v. British
Broad Corp.,42 an English national argued that while he
could have brought suit against the BBC in England,
England was not an adequate forum because it does not
permit contingency fee arrangements. Therefore, he did
not have the financial means to litigate in England, and
hence, England was not available to adjudicate the
dispute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this argument.
The Second Circuit did not deny that the question of
whether a plaintiff had the financial means to bring a suit
in a non-U.S. forum was a factor to be taken into account
after the court had determined that an alternative forum is
available. But the court held that this financial issue could
not be taken into account for the purposes of the threshold
determination of whether an alternative forum was
available in the first place.43
iv. Delay. Generally, a delay of a few years in the foreign
forum is insignificant in the forum non conveniens
calculus."
However, there is a point where the prospective remedy becomes so
remote, that it becomes no remedy at all.45 Where the plaintiff produces
significant evidence documenting the partiality or delay (in years) typically
associated with the adjudication of claims, and these conditions are so severe
41. See, e.g., Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Pavlov v. Bank ofN.Y Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426,434-435 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated on other grounds by
25 Fed. Appx. 70, 2002 WL 63576 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002).
42. 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 292. See In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 217 ("the absence of
contingent fee arrangements in a foreign jurisdiction is a permissible factor to weigh in the forum non
conveniens analysis."). See also Byrne v. BBC, 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
44. See, e.g.,EastmanKodak Co. v. Kavlin,978 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-86, 1086 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(five year delay for civil actions not given great weight, although Bolivia ultimately found inadequate on other
grounds); Manela v. Garantia Banking Ltd., 940 F. Supp. 584, 591 n. II (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (three year or
longer delay in Brazil did not render forum inadequate).
45. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1995) (India held inadequate
where there would be a delay of up to twenty-five years before the litigation could be resolved); Sablic v.
Armada Shipping Aps, 973 F. Supp. 745,748 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (backlog of cases in Croatia possibly resulting
in a lengthy delay cited as one reason for finding it to be an inadequate forum).
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as to call the adequacy of the forum into doubt, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to persuade the district court that the forum is adequate."'
v. Punitive Damages. A Brazilian forum was held to
be adequate even though Brazil did not permit
recovery of punitive damages or damages for pain
and suffering.47
iv. Class Actions. The absence of the class action
procedure "does not ordinarily render a forum
'inadequate' for purposes offorum non conveniens
analysis."4
5. Adequacy of Alternative Forum: Political Issues/Institutional Infirmity
a. While courts have dismissed forum non conveniens motions
based on assertions of political instability or a demonstrated
institutional bias, these conditions must be very severe and well
documented to be taken into account by courts.
b. In the interests of comity, U.S. courts are reluctant to assess the
integrity or quality of foreign judicial systems.
c. Set forth below are some of the arguments considered by courts
in assessing whether a foreign forum is inadequate on grounds
of political instability or institutional bias:
i. Impartiality or Corruption. A generalized concern about
the impartiality of a country's judicial system is not
enough and such claims "[do] not enjoy a particularly
impressive track record."49  Courts are particularly
resistant to these claims when the plaintiff has chosen to
transact business in the foreign forum.5" ("There is a
substantial temerity to the claim that the forum where a
party has chosen to transact business.., is inadequate.")
In Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez. S.A., 51 the Second
Circuit rejected general concerns that the "Venezuelan
system of justice is ... endemically incompetent, biased,
and corrupt."52 In Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 3 the
First Circuit rejected claims that the Turkish justice
system exhibited a "profound bias" against Americans and
46. Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F. 3d 1305, 1313 (11 th Cir. 2001).
47. De Melo v. Lederle Labs., 801 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
48. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
49. Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1084 (collecting cases).
50. Id. at 1084-85
51. 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993).
52. Id.
53. 981 F.2d 1345 (lst Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912.
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foreign women.54 In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp.,5 the court found that "the Peruvian courts furnish
an available and adequate forum for the adjudication of
plaintiffs' claims against Southern Peru and the awarding
of appropriate damages if those claims succeed."56
ii. Fears for Safety. A plaintiff's concern for his or her
individual safety may be given consideration in extreme
situations."
iii Political Unrest. Courts appear to be more sympathetic to
claims of political unrest. In Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v.
TradewindAirways Ltd.,58 a U.S. corporation brought an
action against an English airline for misdelivery of cargo
in Nigeria. The court held that Nigeria was an inadequate
forum, citing strict currency controls that may have
prevented plaintiff from taking out of Nigeria any award
he may have secured, as well as a statute of limitations
that would have provided very little time for plaintiff to
prepare his action. Although the court chose not to decide
the case on this point, the opinion also referred to a travel
advisory warning that portions of the Nigerian
Constitution were suspended, all new legislation was by
decree and violators normally appear before a military
tribunal.59
Similarly, in Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania
de A cero Del Pacifico S.A.,6 the court denied a motion to
dismiss, holding that the defendant failed to establish that
Chile was an adequate forum: "[Plaintiff] has raised
serious questions about the independence of the Chilean
judiciary vis i vis the military junta currently in power."'"
Although there were constitutional provisions in force
54. Id.at 1351.
55. 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
56. But cf Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1085 (holding that, despite the justifiably strong
inclination against granting these claims, the corruption in the Bolivian system was "compelling" enough to
render that forum inadequate).
57. See, e.g., Rasoulzadeh v. Assoc. Press, 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affdmem., 767 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying forum non conveniens motion where plaintiffs would probably be executed if
they returned to Iran). But see Shields v. MiRyung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp. 891, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(rejecting plaintiff's assertions that his safety would be endangered in Saudi Arabia as "unsubstantiated
speculation").
58. 659 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. See also Sablic, 973 F. Supp. at 748 (holding that, although Croatia was making "great strides
towards recovery," the political and military instability still rendered this country an inadequate forum).
60. 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. Id. at 1342.
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guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, the junta
had the ability to amend or rescind the constitution. The
plaintiff's concern about getting a fair trial in Chile was
exacerbated because the defendant was a state-owned
corporation.
E. Characteristics ofPlaintiffAffecting Forum Non Conveniens Analysis
1. Introduction
As noted, a central aspect of the forum non conveniens analysis is the
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum. The degree of
deference shown to a plaintiff's choice of forum depends in large part on
certain characteristics of the plaintiff.
2. Citizenship and/or Residence of Plaintiff
a. General Principle
It has long been a general principle of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens that a U.S. plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference
than that of a non-U.S. plaintiff.62 However, being a U.S. citizen is not
dispositive.63 As a corollary, a non-U.S. plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled
to less deference than that of a U.S. plaintiff.' This is not based on a desire to
disadvantage foreign plaintiffs, but rather on an assessment of the ultimate
convenience of the forum:
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this
choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption
is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's
choice deserves less deference.65
The fact that a plaintiff is foreign, however, is not dispositive. This does
not mean, however, that dismissal is 'automatically barred' when a plaintiff has
chosen his home forum, nor that dismissal is automatically mandated when a
foreign plaintiff is involved. Rather, 'some weight' must be given to the
foreign plaintiff's forum choice, and 'this reduced weight is not an invitation
62. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (plaintiff's choice of
forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has sued in the plaintiffs home forum).
63. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/VNordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("American
citizenship alone is not a barrier to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens.").
64. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-256. See also Ralph v. Long, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8197, at *6 (D.
Md. June 14, 2001).
65. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
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to accord a foreign plaintiffs selection of an American forum no deference
since dismissal forforum non conveniens is the exception rather than the rule.'66
b. The Iragorri Case: Examining Motives for Choice of Forum and for
Motion to Dismiss.
In a recent en banc decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has addressed the general principle that a U.S. plaintiffs choice of forum is
entitled to greater deference than that of a non-U.S. plaintiff and has instructed
courts to look behind the plaintiff's citizenship and/or residence to other
relevant considerations:
We regard the Supreme Court's instructions that (1) a plaintiff's choice of
her home forum should be given great deference, while (2) a foreign resident's
choice of a U.S. forum should receive less consideration, as representing
consistent applications of a broader principle under which the degree of
deference to be given to a plaintiffs choice of forum moves on a sliding scale
depending on several relevant considerations.67
In Iragorri, the Second Circuit convened en banc in order to address the
issue of the deference to be accorded a plaintiffs choice of forum in the light
of three earlier, recent decisions of the Second Circuit,68 which stand for the
proposition that a U.S. resident's choice of forum is entitled to deference even
if that resident chooses to bring suit in a forum different from that plaintiff's
home forum.
Iragorri arose out of an elevator accident that took place in Cali,
Colombia, in which a naturalized U.S. citizen and Florida domiciliary died.
The plaintiffs, the wife and children of the deceased, who were also Florida
domiciliaries, and the estate of the deceased, brought suit in the District Court
for the District of Connecticut against the manufacturer of the elevators--Otis
Elevator Company, and United Technologies Corporation-both of which had
their principal places of business in Connecticut. The defendants moved to
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the suit should be
brought in Cali. The district court granted the motion.
The Second Circuit reversed the decision, but, almost simultaneously,
convened en banc to address the question of what degree of deference to accord
a U.S. plaintiffs choice of forum where suit is brought in a U.S. district
different from the one in which the plaintiff resides. In its en banc decision, the
66. CromerFin. Ltd. v. Berger, 158 F. Supp. 2d 347,354 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted). See
also Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001).
67. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. Guidi v. Inter-Cont ' Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); and DiRienzo v. Philip Services Corp., 232 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.
2000), vacated by 294 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2002),
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Second Circuit held that the district court did not accord the proper degree of
deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum, and vacated the district court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In the course of its en banc decision, the Second Circuit rejected the notion
that there was a hard and fast rule that a U.S. plaintiff's choice of forum should
be accorded deference only where the suit is brought in plaintiff's home district.
Rather, it is necessary to examine why the U.S. plaintiff brought suit outside of
her home forum to determine whether it was done for valid reasons or to obtain
a tactical advantage.
The Second Circuit stated:
The rule is not so abrupt or arbitrary. One of the factors that
necessarily affects a plaintiffs choice of forum is the need to sue in
a place where the defendant is amenable to suit. Consider for
example a hypothetical plaintiff residing in New Jersey, who brought
suit in the Southern District ofNew York, barely an hour's drive from
the plaintiffs residence, because the defendant was amenable to suit
in the Southern District but not in New Jersey. It would make little
sense to withhold deference for the plaintiff s choice merely because
she did not sue in her home district. Where a U.S. resident leaves her
home district to sue the defendant where the defendant has established
itself and is thus amenable to suit, this would not ordinarily indicate
a choice motivated by desire to impose tactical disadvantage on the
defendant. This is all the more true where the defendant's amen-
ability to suit in the plaintiffs home district is unclear. A plaintiff
should not be compelled to mount a suit in a district where she cannot
be sure of perfecting jurisdiction over the defendant, if by moving to
another district, she can be confident of bringing the defendant before
the court. In many circumstances, it will be far more convenient for
a U.S. resident plaintiff to sue in a U.S. court than in a foreign
country, even though it is not the district in which the plaintiff resides.
It is not a correct understanding of the rule to accord deference only
when the suit is brought in the plaintiff's home district.69
Thus, instead of a hard and fast rule, the Second Circuit asserted that
courts should look at the reasons or motivation that led a plaintiff to choose a
particular forum. More particularly, the Second Circuit distinguished a forum
chosen for "legitimate reasons" from one chosen for "tactical advantage."7
The Second Circuit did not give an exhaustive list of what constitute "legitimate
reasons" for the choice of forum or what constitutes a choice for "tactical
69. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72-73 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
70. Id. at 73.
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advantage." But it did allude to certain motives that would fall into one or
another category.
Thus, one legitimate reason for the choice of a particular U.S. forum
includes, in the case of a U.S. resident or citizen, the amenability of the
defendant to suit in the chosen forum, as opposed to plaintiffs home forum.
"A plaintiff should not be compelled to mount a suit in a district where she
cannot be sure of perfecting jurisdiction over the defendant, if by moving to
another district, she can be confident of bringing the defendant before the
court."71
Similarly, a plaintiff would have been motivated by the desire to obtain a
"tactical advantage" or has selected a forum for "forum-shopping reasons," 72
when it appears that a U.S. forum was chosen because:
United States courts award higher damages than are common in other
countries"; "local laws... favor plaintiff's case"; of the "habitual
generosity of juries in the United States or in the forum district"; of
the "plaintiff's popularity or the defendant's unpopularity in the
region"; of "the inconvenience and expense to the defendant resulting
from litigation in that forum.73
The Second Circuit also made clear that the court should not simply
scrutinize the motivations for a plaintiff's choice of a particular forum, but it
should also examine a defendant's motivations in making a motion to dismiss
on grounds offorum non conveniens.
Courts should be mindful that,just as plaintiffs sometimes choose a forum
for forum-shopping reasons, defendants also may move for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens not because of genuine concern with
convenience, but because of similar forum-shopping reasons. District courts
should therefore arm themselves with an appropriate degree of skepticism in
assessing whether the defendant has demonstrated genuine inconvenience and
a clear preferability of the foreign forum. And the greater the degree to which
the plaintiff has chosen a forum where the defendant's witnesses and evidence
are to be found, the harder it should be for the defendant to demonstrate
inconvenience.74
Moreover, the Second Circuit also made it clear that the appropriate degree
of deference due to a U.S. citizen's choice of forum will also turn on whether
that citizen is also a resident of the United States.
71. Id.
72. Id. at71.
73. Id. at 71-72.
74. Id. at 75.
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When Guidi spoke of the deference due to the choice of forum by U.S.
"citizens," we understand these references to signify citizens who were also
U.S. residents, rather than situations in which an expatriate U.S. citizen residing
permanently in a foreign country brings suit in the United States .... As to
such suits, it would be less reasonable to assume the choice of forum is based
on convenience.75
While the facts of Iragorri-and the specific question to be addressed by
the Second Circuit-relate to the choice by a U.S. resident plaintiff of a forum
other than its home forum, the Second Circuit made clear that principle
articulated in that case was not limited to that fact pattern, but applied more
generally to all plaintiffs, whether domestic or forum:
The Second Circuit stated that: "The more it appears that a domestic
or foreign plaintiff's choice of forum has been dictated by reasons
that the law will recognize as valid, the greater the deference that will
be given to the plaintiff's choice of forum... On the other hand, the
more it appears that the plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum was
motivated by forum-shopping reasons ... the less deference the
plaintiff's choice commands...""
Thus, in Iragorri, it appears that the Second Circuit has instructed district
courts conducting a forum non conveniens analysis not to attach decisive
significance to the citizenship or residence of the plaintiff, but, rather, to
attempt to ascertain the reasons for why a plaintiff chose one forum rather than
another.
As the Second Circuit stated in Iragorri, "while plaintiff's citizenship and
residence can serve as a proxy for, or indication of, convenience, neither the
plaintiffs citizenship nor residence, nor the degree of deference given to her
choice of forum controls the outcome.""
c. Decisions Applying Iragorri
Recent decisions applying Iragorri have applied to foreign plaintiffs.
These decisions have also made it clear that it is hard to distinguish between
bringing suit for "tactical advantage" and bringing suit for "legitimate
considerations." In In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation," a Canadian
plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. and sought to justify litigating in the U.S. "by
noting that Canada does not permit punitive damages awards in cases like these,
75. Id. at 73 n.5.
76. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 74.
78. 214 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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a point... that underscores the fact that plaintiff's suit here is the product of
forum shopping."79 The court held that "[p]laintiff s choice of forum is entitled
to little weight in view of his foreign residence and forum shopping."80
In Wesoke v. Contract Services, Ltd.,"' by contrast, the court held that the
U.S. plaintiff brought suit in the United States for legitimate reasons because
"[P]laintiffs' papers make clear that their main purpose in bringing this action
in the United States was to avoid the substantial (and in all likelihood
prohibitive) expense of litigating in the United Kingdom-expenses generally
associated with litigating a case overseas coupled with the particular
requirement in the United Kingdom that a plaintiff post a substantial bond to
guarantee the payment of attorneys' fees." But bringing suit in one forum to
avoid costs of litigation in another could just as easily be characterized as an
attempt to receive a "tactical advantage" as opposed to a "legitimate
consideration."
In DiRienzo v. Philip Services Corp.,2 the court, relying on Iragorri,
questioned the defendant's motives for moving to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.
3. Treaties
There are several trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries
that accord nationals of these countries the equivalent access and consideration
that U.S. citizens receive in U.S. courts. When a foreign plaintiff is a national
of a country that is party to such a treaty, that plaintiff's choice of forum is
accorded the same presumption as a U.S. citizen's. 3
In the Iragorri case, the Second Circuit cited to a letter provided to the
Second Circuit by the Department of Justice in response to its inquiry about
how the question to be addressed by the en banc panel "might be affected by
U.S. treaty obligations, including those affording access to U.S. courts." 4 It is
interesting to note that while the Department of Justice acknowledged the
existence of treaties that accorded to foreign nationals access to U.S. courts on
terms no less favorable than those enjoyed by U.S. nationals, it added that "any
right of access afforded to a foreign national plaintiff by treaty will generally
79. Id. at 400.
80. Id.
81. No. 00 Civ. 1188 (CBM), 2002 WL 1560775 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002).
82. 294 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 2002).
83. See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez. S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that, due to treaty between the U.S. and Venezuela, "no discount may be imposed upon the plaintiff's initial
choice of a New York forum"); Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1984); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/VNordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 890 (1980).
84. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 69 n.2.
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be only a right to the same access that would be accorded to a U.S. national who
is otherwise similarly situated."85
In Iragorri, the Second Circuit stated that "[t]hough the instant case does
not implicate any treaty obligations, the forum non conveniens analysis that we
articulate here is mindful of those considerations."86
In Pollux,7 the Second Circuit considered a treaty between the United
States and Liberia, which provided "freedom of access" to citizens of Liberia.
The court distinguished this treaty from treaties which provide "equal access"
to foreign nationals, and held that plaintiffs' choice of forum should be
accorded "the lesser degree of deference typically afforded foreign plaintiffs."88
4. Suit Involves Plaintiffs Activities Abroad: Corporations v. Individuals
When a U.S. corporation engages extensively in business in a foreign
country and brings suit in a U.S. court based on events occurring abroad, the
strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum is discounted.
a. This is based on the underlying rationale of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens: "A corporate plaintiff's citizenship or
residence may not correlate with its real convenience because of
the nature of the corporate entity, while an individual's
residence more often will correlate with his or her
convenience."89 As the court also noted: "Judicial concern for
allowing citizens ofthe United States access to American courts
has been tempered by the expansion and realities of
international commerce." 9
b. By contrast, the strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's
choice of forum is affirmed when the plaintiff is a U.S.
individual in a tort action, such as the plaintiffs in Reid- Walen,
a couple injured while vacationing in Jamaica. 9'
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. 329 F.3d at 73.
88. Id.
89. Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 n.8 (8th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1395.
91. Id. at 1392. See also Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147, where the court stated: "Plaintiffs ... are ordinary
American citizens for whom litigating in Egypt presents an obvious and significant inconvenience, ... This
is not a case where the plaintiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign
courts."
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5. Class Actions
If a plaintiff brings suit as a representative of a class, his or her choice of
forum is entitled to less weight.9 2 But this does not mean that the plaintiffs'
choice of forum is entitled to no weight, it depends on plaintiffs' motive for
choosing a U.S. forum.93 ("[P]laintiffs offered a quite valid reason for litigating
in federal court: this county's interest in having United States Courts enforce
United States securities laws.").
F. Balancing Public and Private Interests
1. Introduction
The courts must also balance certain public and private interests to
determine whether to dismiss the suit on grounds of forum non conveniens.
There is a relationship between the degree of deference accorded a plaintiff's
choice of forum and the balancing of the private and public interest factors.
The greater the deference due, the stronger a showing of inconvenience a
defendant must make, and vice versa.94
2. Public Interests
a. The administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion.
i. The Southern District ofNew York is indisputably "one of
the busiest districts in the country." Not surprisingly, the
judges in this district have placed additional weight on this
factor, citing "[tlhe need to guard our docket from
disputes with little connection to this forum." '9
b. The local interest in having controversies decided at home.
c. The interest in having the trial in a forum that is familiar with
the law governing the action.
d. The avoidance ofunnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in
the application of foreign law.
e. The unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with
jury duty.96
92. DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 2002).
93. Id.
94. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 74-75.
95. Hyland, 807 F. Supp. at 1128 (citations omitted). But see Cromer, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 355,
where the court stated that: "While the docket of the Southern District [of New York] is an active one, courts
in this district have shown themselves more than able to address the issues that arise in complex actions in
an expeditious and comprehensive manner."
96. But see Moscovits v. Magyar Cukor R., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June




a. The relative ease of access to sources of proof and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses.
i. As modem advances have made international travel and
communication both easier and cheaper, this factor has
taken on a reduced importance.97
b. The availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses.
i. U.S. courts have recently relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in
considering motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds.
ii. Specifically, section 1782, which permits a party to a
foreign litigation to obtain evidence located in the U.S.,
has been relied upon to meet an objection to a motion to
dismiss that U.S. documents or witnesses are beyond the
reach of the foreign court.98
c. The remoteness of forum from the situs of the event, including
possibility of viewing premises, if it would be appropriate to the
action.
d. The ability to implead third parties.
e. The need to translate documents.
i. Translation is considered a serious problem and where all
of the documents and testimony would be in a foreign
language, this factor "militates strongly in favor of the
[foreign forum]."
jurisdiction was based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), which does not allow for a jury
trial.
97. Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l, S.A., 712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire doctrine of forum non conveniens should be reexamined in light of the
transportation revolution .. "). Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 44 (D. Conn. 1996). ("To
the extent documents exist in England, advances in transportation and communication accord this issue less
weight.")
98. See PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 75 (affirming that the Indonesian court would be an
adequate alternate forum and noting the district court's consideration of "the possibility, under 28 U.S.C. §
1782, of gaining access to witnesses or documents in the United States"); Potomac Capital Inv. Corp. v.
Koninklijke Luchtvaapt Maatschappl N. V., No. 97 Civ. 8141, 1998 WL 92416, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 4,
1998) (holding that the Netherlands was an adequate forum and that "[Potomac] can use 28 U.S.C. 1782 to
obtain discovery from... U.S. based non-party witnesses for use at trial in the Netherlands."); Pyrenee, Ltd.
v. Wocom Commodities, Ltd., 984 F. Supp. 1148, 1162 (N.D. 111. 1997) (holding that Hong Kong was a more
convenient forum and the concern that U.S. documents would not be attainable was alleviated by section
1782). But cf Slight v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 979 F. Supp. 433, 440 (S.D. W.Va. 1997)
(observing that while section 1782 would provide access to needed documents, the "frequent shuttling of
documents and attorneys" such requests would entail would be costly).
99. Blanco, 997 F.2dat982. But see Ingram Micro, Inc. v. Airoute Cargo Express, Inc., 2001 U.S.
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f. Issues concerning the enforceability ofjudgment if obtained.
g. All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive or the opposite.
4. Completion of Pretrial Discovery
a. In Alfadda, 159 F.3d at 48, the plaintiff argued that the fact that
the pretrial discovery had been completed in New York favored
that forum rather than the French forum.
b. The Second Circuit noted in passing that there was some dispute
as to whether completed discovery was a public or private
factor. "
c. The Second Circuit went on to note that
[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the extent of completed discovery is
relevant-whether as a public or private interest-we do not believe
that it tips the balance towards an American forum. The traditional
public and private interest factors weigh heavily in favor of France.
Completing discovery within the Southern District and investing
financial resources in order to facilitate trial in the United States does
not sufficiently tip the scales of the Gilbert balance, especially since
plaintiffs are free to use the existing discovery material to whatever
extent the French tribunal will permit.°10
G. Conditional Dismissals
1. Introduction
Conditioned dismissals protect the plaintiff from being penalized by
choosing to file suit first in the U.S. while also facilitating the dismissal of
suits. If the proponent of dismissal fails to comply with the order, the action
will be reinstated in the U.S. "[F]orum non conveniens dismissals are often
appropriately conditioned to protect the party opposing dismissal."'
0 2
2. Standards for Granting a Conditional Dismissal
In the recent BCCI case, the Second Circuit set forth "the type of finding
that the district court should make regarding the adequacy of an alternative
Dist. LEXIS 2912, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the need for translation of documents alone is not
a hardship of sufficient magnitude to justify dismissal).
100. Compare Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 817 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987) (public interest) with Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985) (private interest) and Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
935 F.2d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1991) (discovery "goes to both private concerns... and public ones").
101. Alfadda, 159 F.3d at 48.
102. Blanco, 997 F.2d at 984.
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foreign forum in a case in which foreign law or practice is at issue, and in
which a case is dismissed conditionally."' 0
3
In that case, following a review of competing expert affidavits about
whether Pakistan was an adequate forum, the district court granted a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds on three conditions: (i) plaintiffs
agreement in writing to waive any statute of limitations defense; (ii) the
Pakistani courts not refusing to hear the case onforum non conveniens grounds;
and (iii) plaintiffs agreement in writing to permit defendants to remove any
judgment rendered by a Pakistani court out of Pakistan."" The district court
granted this conditional dismissal based on a "justifiable belief' that Pakistan
was an adequate alternative forum. 5
Under the "justifiable belief' standard a court may dismiss a case on forum
non conveniens grounds "despite its inability to make a definitive finding as to
the adequacy of the foreign forum, if the court can protect the non-moving party
by making the dismissal conditional.""1 6 The Second Circuit made it clear,
however, that the justifiable belief standard imposed certain requirements on
the district court.
0 7
First, the district court is required to engage in a full analysis of those
issues of foreign law and practice relevant to its decision. Second, the district
court is required to closely examine all submissions relating to the adequacy of
the foreign forum. Third, if the court concludes it has a justifiable belief that
the foreign forum is adequate, it should cite to evidence in record supporting
that belief. Fourth, the district court should keep in mind that it is the
defendant's burden to demonstrate the existence of an adequate alternative
forum. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the degree of certainty a district
court needed to have about the existence of an adequate alternative forum
turned on "how protective of the non-moving party the conditional dismissal
will in fact be." ' 8 The Second Circuit stated, therefore, that if the condition on
which dismissal is granted might not sufficiently protect the plaintiff, then "the
court should either be more sure of its finding as to the uncertain question of
law or practice, and therefore as to the adequacy of the alternative forum, or
frame the condition differently, if that is possible, in order to minimize the
risk."'109
103. BCC!, 273 F.3d at 247.
104. Id. at 244.
105. See id. at 247 (citing cases applying the "justifiable belief' standards).
106. Id.
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The Second Circuit concluded:
we observe that while the conditional dismissal device can help to
protect the non-moving party in circumstances where the district court
remains concerned about the accuracy of its "justifiable belief' as to
a foreign forum's adequacy, the mechanism is not a substitute for the
initial "justifiable belief' of adequacy. Conditions cannot transform
an inadequate forum into an adequate one."'
3. Conditions Typically Imposed
The following are the most commonly granted conditions and have been
almost universally deemed permissible:
a. Statute of Limitations. An adequate forum does not exist if a
statute of limitations bars the bringing of the case in that
forum."' In order to deal with this, courts have conditioned
forum non conveniens dismissals on an agreement by the
defendant to waive any statute of limitations defense that may
exist in the foreign forum. This condition protects a plaintiff
from possibly losing the opportunity to litigate in another forum
because of the time spent pursuing a case in the U.S." 2
b. Jurisdiction. A number of courts have dismissed cases on forum
non conveniens grounds conditioned on the party's consent to
jurisdiction in the foreign forum." 3 The importance of this
factor was demonstrated in a recent Second Circuit decision that
overturned a forum non conveniens dismissal because the
district court failed to have the plaintiff stipulate to jurisdiction
in Ecuador." 4
c. Availability of witnesses or documents. In Piper, the Supreme
Court specifically condoned the possibility of conditioning a
forum non conveniens dismissal on the proponent's agreement
to provide the relevant records.' However, this condition is
not without limits, and courts have been hesitant to grant the full
panoply ofU.S. discovery provisions. While such a broad grant
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. BCCI, 273 F.3d at 246.
112. See, e.g., Transunion, 811 F.2d at 128; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster in
Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195,203-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Blanco, 997 F.2d at 984 (collecting cases). See llusorio
v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
113. See, e.g., R. Maganlal & Co. v. MG. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); Mercier,
981 F.2d at 1349. See also Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998).
115. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25.
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is sometimes appropriate it is generally looked upon with
disfavor." 6
d. Delay. In BCCI, the case was to be heard in Pakistan's courts
if it were dismissed. Expert evidence was submitted by the
plaintiff to the effect that a suit might take up to 25 years to be
resolved in the Pakistani court system. Defendant's expert
submitted evidence that plaintiff's claim would be heard by a
special Banking Court in Pakistan, in which the case would
proceed on an expedited basis. On appeal the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
include a condition to deal with the delay in Pakistan in the
event the district court dismissed the case. Specifically, it
instructed the district court to condition any dismissal on the
Banking Court's acceptance of jurisdiction and to permit the
plaintiff to return to the district court in the event Pakistan's
Banking Court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit stated:
Accordingly, the district court, if it decides to dismiss, should
condition dismissal on the Banking Court's accepting
jurisdiction over this case. In specifying this condition, we do
not mean to impose any requirement on the Banking Court, a
step that could be beyond our authority. We are simply
requiring the district court to permit BCCI Overseas to restore
this case to the district court's docket in the event that the
Banking Court determines it lacks jurisdiction." 7
e. Enforcement of Judgment. Courts have also conditioned
dismissals on the proponent's agreement to pay any judgment
rendered in the foreign forum.
4. Conditions Typically Rejected
However, not all conditions are permissible and appellate courts will
review and strike down conditions that are overreaching. The following are
examples of conditions that have been rejected as an inappropriate interference
with the foreign forum:
a. Waiver of cost bond. In Mercier, the plaintiffs proposed that
the dismissal be conditioned on defendant's waiving the cost
bond that is normally imposed on foreign litigants in Turkish
116. Hyland, 807 F. Supp. at 1132 (citing concern that the routine granting of this condition would
encourage litigants, without any real chance of success, to file suit in the U.S. simply to gain this advantage).
See, e.g., Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 205 (collecting cases).
117. BCCI, 273 F.3d at 247.
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courts. "' The court, noting that the bond was not excessive and
the plaintiffs were not indigent, rejected this proposal."1 9
b. Monitor for due process violations. Citing concerns with
perceived shortcomings of the Indian judicial system, the
plaintiffs in Union Carbide requested that the American judge
monitor the proceedings in India so that there were not any due
process violations and, if necessary, remedy any abuses. 20 The
Second Circuit denied this request, noting that once the case is
dismissed the U.S. "ceases to have any jurisdiction over the
matter."121
III. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A. Commencing Parallel Proceedings
1. Introduction
If party A files suit in one forum (Fl) against party B, party B could
commence suit against party A on the same claim in another forum (F2). In F2,
party B could either seek a negative declaration or assert as affirmative claims
the counterclaims it could assert in F 1.
2. Strategic Considerations
a. There are several reasons why party B might commence parallel
proceedings:
i. In the hope of winning a race to judgment in the more
favorable forum (F2) and securing a judgment that can be
pled as res judicata in the other jurisdiction (F 1).
ii. To put pressure on party A by waging a war on two fronts.
iii. To obtain discovery of material located in F2 that it might
otherwise be unable to obtain.
b. If a party to a U.S. suit is considering commencing a parallel
proceeding in a foreign forum, it should take into account the
reaction of the U.S. judge in the pending U.S. suit.
3. Races To Judgment
a. If party B commences a parallel proceeding in a foreign
jurisdiction with the aim of winning a race to judgment, it is
118. Mercier, 981 F.2d at 1353.
119. Id.
120. Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 204-05.
121. Id. at 205.
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important for it to seek advice from a local lawyer as to how
long it would take to litigate the case to judgment in the foreign
court.
b. It is also important for party B to ascertain in advance, to the
extent possible, whether a judgment from F2 is likely to be
recognized and granted res judicata effect in F 1.
c. This issue was addressed in Alfadda, Here, the plaintiffs, non-
U.S. citizens residing in Saudi Arabia, brought parallel
proceedings in the courts of U.S. and France in connection with
their investment in defendant Saudi European Investment
Corporation, a Netherlands Antilles corporation.1 22 In the U.S.
suit, the plaintiffs alleged violations of RICO and the U.S.
securities laws.
i. There followed a race to judgment. Defendants prevailed
in the French courts, and moved to dismiss the U.S.
actions on the basis of the preclusive effect of the French
action. There were two issues for the court: 1) whether to
recognize the French judgment; and 2) having decided to
recognize it, to determine the scope of its preclusive
effect.
ii. In determining whether to recognize the French judgment,
the court applied the doctrine of comity as set forth in the
leading case of Hilton v. Guyod23 , which holds that, for
reasons of international comity, a U.S. court will enforce
a foreign judgment "whenever the foreign court had
properjurisdiction and enforcement does not prejudice the
rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public
policy."' 24 The court found that the French judgment
satisfied this test, especially in light of the fact that
plaintiffs themselves initiated proceedings in France.
iii. In determining whether to grant preclusive effect to the
French judgment, the court took into account nine factors.
Four of these factors are relevant to assessing the
preclusive effect of any judgment, whether it be a U.S. or
a foreign judgment; the other five were applied because
they were said to be relevant to recognition of non-U.S.
judgments.
iv. The four factors applicable to both the domestic and
international context are: the issues of both proceedings
must be identical; the relevant issues were actually
litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; there must
122. 966 F. Supp. at 1325-32.
123. 159 U.S. 113(1895).
124. Id. at 1326 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03).
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have been "full and fair opportunity" for the litigation of
the issues in the prior proceeding; and the issues were
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the
merits.
v. The five additional factors relevant to issue preclusion in
the international context are: a desire to avoid the dupli-
cation of effort and the waste involved in reconsidering a
matter that has already been litigated; a desire to protect
the successful litigant from harassing or evasive tactics on
the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent; a policy
against making the availability of local enforcement the
decisive element, as a practical matter, in the plaintiff's
choice of forum; an interest in fostering stability and unity
in international litigation; and a belief that the rendering
court was the more appropriate forum.
vi. In Alfadda, the district court reviewed the French judg-
ment and found that it was preclusive of the U.S. pro-
ceeding because the issues considered by the French court
were sufficiently identical to those the plaintiffs would
have had to establish in order to prevail on their claims
and the issues were necessary to support the French
court's judgment. The court also noted "that France, the
rendering jurisdiction, is a more appropriate forum, both
because of convenience, and because France, the home
country to all the defendant banks and much of the alleged
conduct, has a greater interest in the litigation."'25
d. By contrast, in Alesayi Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Corp.,126
the court recognized a Saudi Arabian judgment on a breach of
contract claim, but denied its preclusive effect because of
different standards of proof. Specifically, although Alesayi, a
Saudi Arabian company, failed to prevail in the Saudi court, the
U.S. court did not give preclusive effect to this judgment
because, in Saudi Arabia, Alesayi was required to prove its
claim for breach of contract beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
U.S., however, it only had to prove its breach of contract claim
by a preponderance of the evidence.127
125. Alfadda, 966 F. Supp. at 1332.
126. 947 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1997).
127. See generally Linda S ilberman, Enforcement andRecognition ofForeign Country Judgments,
International Business Litigation and Arbitration (PLI Coursebook 2004).
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4. Parallel Proceedings and Other Strategies
a. The commencement of parallel proceedings works best when
combined with other strategies. For example, if party B (a
defendant in a U.S. action) commences a parallel proceeding
outside the U.S. in an attempt to win a race to judgment, it could
also combine it with the following motions: (i) a motion for an
antisuit injunction in the non-U.S. court seeking to enjoin party
A from pursuing its U.S. lawsuit; (ii) a motion in the U.S. court
to dismiss the U.S. action on grounds offorum non conveniens
(see Section III above); or (iii) a motion in the U.S. court to stay
or dismiss the U.S. action on the ground that there is a parallel
proceeding (see Section IV below).
b. If party B (a defendant in a U.S. action) commences a parallel
proceeding in a non-U.S. forum, party A (the plaintiff in the
U.S. action) could respond by making a motion for an antitrust
injunction in the U.S. court seeking to enjoin party B from
pursuing the action in the non-U.S. forum (see Section V
below).




a. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,'28 the Supreme Court held
that "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases
based on abstention principles only where the relief being
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary" (emphasis
added).
b. There is some dispute as to whether Quackenbush applies in
cases involving parallel foreign litigation.
i. Some courts which have addressed the issue have held that
Quackenbush is simply inapplicable in cases involving
concurrent international litigation.'29
128. 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). See also Lewin v. Cooke, 95 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D.Va. 2000)
(abstention doctrines are simply not applicable to suits for damages, but apply only to suits in equity).
129. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1999); Goldhammer v.
Dunkin'Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999) ("Quackenbush does not crisply govern in
the area of international abstention because the considerations involved in deferring to state court proceedings
are different from those involved in deferring to foreign proceedings.").
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ii. Some post-Quackenbush decisions have held that a court
has an inherent power to dismiss an action based on the
pendency of a related proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction
without specifically seeking to distinguish Quacken-
bush. 130
2. Factors Used to Determine Whether to Grant a Stay on International
Abstention Grounds
In determining whether an action should be dismissed or stayed under the
doctrine of "international abstention," courts take into account the following
factors:
a. the similarity of parties and issues involved in the foreign
litigation; the promotion of judicial efficiency; adequacy of
relief available in the alternative forum; issues of fairness to
and convenience of foreign witnesses; the possibility of
prejudice to any of the parties; and the temporal sequence of the
filing of the actions.131
3. Similarity of Parties
It is settled that the parties need not be identical. For example, in
Goldhammer, even though an individual shareholder or plaintiff corporation
was named as a party in U.S. litigation, but not in parallel English litigation, the
court noted that the individual held a two-thirds interest in the corporation and,
therefore, had substantially similar interests to those of the corporation. "While
a shareholder may have claims independent of the corporation, the parties and
claims need not be identical in order for one action to be stayed or dismissed
in deference to an earlier action."'132
130. See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104 n. I (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (noting that "the considerations involved in deferring to state court proceedings are different from those
involved in deferring to foreign proceedings, where concerns of international comity arise and issues of
federalism and federal supremacy are not in play"). But see Exxon Research & Eng "g Co. v. Indus. Risk
Insurers, 775 A.2d 601, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding that the same general principles apply
regardless of whether they arise from similar actions brought in state or foreign courts); EFCO Corp. v.
Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (staying U.S. action in favor of Canadian
action). But see Abdullah SayidRajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp.,
988 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that Quackenbush precludes an outright dismissal, but
not a stay, in favor of parallel foreign litigation).
131. Evergreen, 954 F. Supp. at 103; Abdullah, 988 F. Supp. at 1289; Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (D. Colo. 2000)
132. Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 253. See also Caspian lnv., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770




As withforum non conveniens, courts may grant abstention motions only
on certain conditions. In Evergreen, the stay granted in favor of the Belgian
proceeding was conditioned on
1) An agreement by the party to consent to jurisdiction of Belgian
courts;
2) Agreement by the party to waive any statute of limitations
defense;
3) Agreement by the party to be bound by the judgment of the
Belgian court;
4) And to pay any judgment obtained.'
B. Contrast to Forum Non Conveniens
1. Conceptual Difference
The conceptual difference between the doctrine offorum non conveniens
and that of international abstention is that the former can be invoked even if
there is no parallel foreign proceeding, whereas the latter presupposes a parallel
foreign proceeding: if there is no parallel foreign proceeding, a party can rely
only on the doctrine offorum non conveniens; if there is one, a party can rely
on both doctrines.
2. Practical Difference
While the factors used to assess motions based on each of the doctrines are
not identical, courts generally consider the two doctrines together (with the
exception of one factor discussed below). 134
F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408,410
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 800537 Ont., Inc. v. World Imps. U.S.A. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 288 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that similarity of actions and issues trumps absence of similarity of parties).
133. Evergreen, 954 F. Supp. at 105.
134. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (D.N.J. 1990) ("The
factors informing the decision on forum non conveniens appear to be fully responsive to those informing a
decision to stay [in favor of a parallel French action], and a detailed presentation on both grounds is simply
unwarranted."); Reavis v. GulfOil Corp., 85 F.R.D. 666, 671 n.3 (D. Del. 1980) (defendant's motions to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, and motion to stay in favor of Venezuelan action, addressed
together under the doctrine of forum non conveniens); General Motors Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948
F. Supp. 656, 668-69 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (denying both a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens and
motion to stay pending outcome of German proceeding).
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3. Earlier Filed Foreign Proceeding
One factor relevant to a motion for a stay on international abstention
grounds has no explicit role in the forum non conveniens analysis-the
sequence of the filing of the actions. It is worth noting, however, that some
courts have not attached much significance to the argument that the U.S. action
should be stayed because the foreign action was filed earlier. For example, in
American Cyanamid, the court denied the motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens, but went on to consider as a separate factor of the
motion to stay the fact that the French action was filed first. It found "little
merit" in this argument. 35 The court stated that where parallel proceedings are
taking place in different countries, "the preferred course of action is to permit
each sovereign to reach judgment and apply the findings of one to the other
under principles of res judicata."'3 6  The American Cyanamid court also
considered the "first to file" argument "as a call for judicial efficiency-
presumably on the ground that the court first obtaining jurisdiction will have
already expended some resources on the case." 137 The court found, on the facts,
that more progress had been made in the second-filed U.S. action than in the
first-filed French action, and therefore rejected this argument. This suggests,
however, that where more progress has been made in the earlier-filed foreign





It is well settled that U.S. courts have the power to issue an antisuit
injunction-that is an injunction enjoining a person subject to theirjurisdiction
from prosecuting a foreign suit. 139 It is important to note that this injunction is
aimed not at the foreign court, but at the party over which the U.S. court has
jurisdiction. Failure to comply with the antisuit injunction, therefore, is
contempt of court.
135. American Cyanamid, 741 F. Supp. at 1159.
136. Id. (citing Sea Containers, Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
137. American Cyanamid, 741 F. Supp. at 1159.
138. See also General Motors, 948 F. Supp. at 669 ("While Plaintiffs sought the jurisdiction of the
German civil court by filing their counterclaim there before filing their complaint in this court, that factor
does not compel a stay of this case because the counterclaim is not identical to this suit."). But see Nat 7
Union, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (finding that because the London proceeding was first filed, there were
practical advantages to advancing the litigation in that forum).




Three threshold requirements must be met before a court will consider
issuing an antisuit injunction.
a. Jurisdiction must be established. 4 '
b. The parties must be the same in both matters. 4 '
c. Resolution of the case before the enjoining court must be
dispositive of the action to be enjoined. 42
B. Circuit Split
U.S. courts differ on the appropriate legal standard for issuing an antisuit
injunction once the threshold requirements have been met.
1. Restrictive Standard: Comity
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth and District of
Columbia Circuits follow a strict test based on the notion of comity.' Courts
following the comity standard have held that as a result of comity concerns,
antisuit injunctions should be "rarely issued" and only in two situations:
a. to protect the U.S. forum's jurisdiction, or
b. to prevent evasion of important public policies.
2. Liberal Standard: Vexatiousness
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits follow a
more relaxed test based upon several factors, the most important of which is the
vexatiousness or oppressiveness of the non-U.S. litigation.144 Courts that have
adopted the "vexatiousness" standard hold that an antisuit injunction is
appropriate in circumstances when the foreign litigation:
140. See In re Complaint ofRationis Enters., Inc. of Panama v. AEP/Borden Indus., 261 F.3d 264
(2d Cir. 2001).
141. China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. See Id.
143. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); China Trade, 837 F.2d at
34; CompagnieDes Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. ofN. America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1105 (1982), Younis Brothers & Co., Inc. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745-
46 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
144. See, e.g., Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626-27; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d
425 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat '1 Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 198 1),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
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a. would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction;
b. would be vexatious or oppressive;
c. would threaten the issuing court's jurisdiction; and when
adjudication in separate actions would result in delay,
inconvenience, expense, inconsistency or race to judgment.
3. Totality of Circumstances Standard: First Circuit
In a decision of March 8, 2004, the First Circuit, which up to now had not
ruled on the appropriate standard for anti-suit injunctions, has weighed in with
its views. Rather than join one or the other side of the circuit split, the First
Circuit has staked out a third position. The First Circuit acknowledges that
considerations of international comity should be accorded great weight in
deciding whether to issue an anti-suit injunction. In doing so, it follows the
conservative approach. It departs from that approach, however, by declining
to endorse the view that an anti-suit injunction is justified only in two
circumstances-threat to jurisdiction and public policy. The First Circuit,
instead, offers a new test that looks to the "totality of circumstances."
C. Comity Standard
1. Basic Principles
a. Courts following the comity standard observe the general
principle that one court will not interfere with or try to restrain
proceedings in another court.,4
b. Rather, in cases involving parallel proceedings, the court will
allow the litigation to proceed in both forums until judgment is
obtained in one court which may be pled as resjudicata in the
other court.'46
c. Under the comity standard, duplication of issues, vexatiousness
and harassment do not justify interfering in an action in a
foreign court. "'
2. Requirements for Antisuit Injunction
A court following the comity standard will refrain from issuing an antisuit
injunction unless one of two factors can be shown: (a) the foreign action
145. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-27.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 928.
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threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining court, or (b) a party is attempting to
evade an important public policy.
a. Foreign Action Threatens the Jurisdiction of the Enjoining
Court. An antisuit injunction may be appropriate where the
foreign action threatens the jurisdiction ofthe enjoining court.'
• A court may find that a foreign action threatens its jurisdiction
in one of two circumstances.
i) An antisuit injunction may be appropriate when a pro-
ceeding is in rem since resjudicata alone will not protect
the jurisdiction of the first court. Where jurisdiction is
based on the presence of property within the court's
jurisdictional boundaries, a concurrent proceeding in a
foreign court poses a danger that the foreign court will
order the transfer of the property out of the jurisdictional
boundaries of the first court, thus depriving it ofjurisdic-
tion over the matter. 49 or,
ii) In an in personam proceeding where the foreign court is
attempting to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over the
action. 50
b. Evasion of Important Public Policies. An antisuit injunction
may be issued when a party attempts to evade compliance with
a statute of the forum that effectuates important public policies.
An injunction is not appropriate merely to prevent a party from
seeking slight advantages in substantive or procedural law to be
applied in a foreign court.''
3. Actions for Negative Declaration
The fact that the defendant in the U.S. proceeding commenced an action
in a foreign court seeking a negative declaration does not in itself warrant the
issuance of an antisuit injunction.
a. In China Trade, plaintiff China Trade sought to import soy-
beans from the U.S. to China using a vessel provided by
defendant, Ssangyong Shipping Co. The vessel ran aground,
allegedly contaminating the soybeans with water. Plaintiff filed
suit in federal court for damages resulting from failure to deliver
the soybeans. While discovery was still progressing, defendant
Ssangyong filed an action in Korea seeking a declaratory judg-
148. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35
149. See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355
150. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35.
151. Id. at 37.
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ment that it was not liable for the damaged soybeans. The
plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction in the U.S. preventing the
defendants from pursuing the Korean action.
The Second Circuit denied the motion, stating that parallel proceedings are
generally tolerable. 152. The court noted that vexatiousness and a race to
judgment are inevitable by-products of parallel proceedings and in themselves
are not sufficient justifications for issuing an antisuit injunction. '
The court held, instead, that the most important factors relevant to the
decision whether to grant an antisuit injunction are (i) whether the foreign
action threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and (ii) whether strong
public policies of the enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign action. 15
The court held that since neither the defendant nor the Korean court had
attempted to enjoin the New York proceedings, there was no threat to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. court. 15 5 In considering the second factor-evasion of
important public policies-the court observed that an injunction is not
appropriate merely because a party has attempted to seek slight advantages in
the procedural or substantive law by litigating in a foreign court. 156
4. Laker Airways
The leading series of cases on the "comity" standard arise out of the Laker
Airways litigation.
a. Laker Airways brought suit against various airlines in a U.S.
federal court alleging that they had violated the U.S. antitrust
laws by engaging in predatory pricing in order to drive Laker
out of business. British Airways ("B.A.") responded by filing
an action against Laker in the British High Court in which it
sought an anti-suit injunction enjoining Laker from proceeding
with the U.S. suit.
b. In response, Laker sought an injunction from the U.S. court
restraining the defendants from continuing with the suit in
England. The lower court issued the injunction. The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed,'57 analyzing the
principles relating to antisuit injunctions.
152. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
153. See id
154. Id.
155. Id at 37.
156. Id.
157. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909.
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The court stated that "parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim
should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a
judgment is reached in one which can be pled as res judicata in the other. The
mere filing of a suit in one forum does not cut off the preexisting right of an
independent forum to regulate matters subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction.
For this reason, injunctions restraining litigants from proceeding in courts of
independent countries are rarely issued." 158 The D.C. Circuit found, therefore,
that issuing an antisuit injunction to avoid a "vexatious" litigation was
inappropriate for two reasons: (i) issues concerning vexatiousness were more
properly considered in a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds;
and (ii) such issues "do not outweigh the important principles of comity that
compel deference and mutual respect for concurrent foreign proceedings."'
' 59
Although the court found that comity favored respect for a non-U.S.
court's ability to reach a judgment, it also found that a U.S. court had the power
to resist the attempt of a foreign court to interfere with its ability to reach a
judgment. It found on the facts that when the English High Court issued its
antisuit injunction, it was attempting to prevent Laker from litigating altogether
and thus to deprive the U.S. court of jurisdiction:
[T]he British and American actions are not parallel proceedings in the
sense the term is normally used. This is not a situation where two
courts are proceedingto separatejudgments simultaneously under one
cause of action. Rather, the sole purpose of the English proceeding
is to terminate the American action. 6 '
The court also noted that antisuit injunctions are justified when necessary
to prevent the litigants' evasion of the U.S. forum's important public policies.
It cautioned, however, that the standard for granting antisuit injunctions on
public policy grounds are strict.
5. Cases DENYING Antisuit Injunctions Under the Comity Standard
a. In Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 6' , discussed above, the
court declined to grant an antisuit injunction enjoining Harrods
from bringing a defamation action against Dow Jones in
London. The court stated:
158. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-27 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at928.
160. ld. at 930.
161. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aft'd, 346 F.3d 357
(2d Cir. 2003).
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, it would not comport with
considerations of "practicality and wise administration ofjustice" for
the courts of one nation as a matter of course to sit in judgment of the
adequacy of due process and the quality of justice rendered in the
courts of other sovereigns, and to decree injunctive relief at any time
the forum courts conclude that the laws of the foreign jurisdiction
under scrutiny do not measure up to whatever the scope of rights and
safeguards the domestic jurisprudence recognizes and enforces to
effectuate its own concept of justice. On this larger scale, there can
be no room for arrogance or presumption, or for extravagant rules or
practices that may encourage insularity or chauvinism rather than
respect for comity. It cannot be the proper province of any one judge
in any one country, giving expression to the push of a moment or the
pull of the immediate case, to promulgate judgments that impose that
court's rule and will across all sovereign borders so as to reach the
rest of humankind.
Specifically, an injunction issued by one forum restraining parties
from pursuing litigation pending in a foreign tribunal withjurisdiction
over the matter could invite a duel of injunction and counterinjunction
to thwart the attempt of the enjoining court to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction and protect the foreign state's own judicial power. As the
Laker Airways court noted, in a dispute depicting precisely this
dynamic: "The consequences to international trade and to amicable
relations between nations that would result from the kind of
interference are difficult to overestimate. 1
62
b. ComputerAssocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,163 Plaintiff, Computer
Associates, previously brought and lost a United States
copyright infringement action in the United States. Computer
Associates then brought an action in a French court alleging
infringement on the same computer program. Defendant, Altai,
unsuccessfully sought an antisuit injunction in federal court. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
the antisuit injunction. The court found that there was no threat
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court and that the French action
would in no way affect the decision already rendered by the
U.S. court in the prior action. l" The court also noted that, while
the action may be vexatious, the interests of comity cautioned
against an injunction. 165
162. Dow Jones, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29.
163. 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997).
164. Id. at 372.
165. Id.
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c. Compagnie des Bauxites: ' In Bauxites, CBG, a company that
mines and sells bauxite in the Republic of Guinea, sued its
excess insurers in the U.S. because the insurers allegedly
improperly refused a claim. Four years later, the insurers sued
in England to rescind the insurance contract because CBG
allegedly failed to disclose material facts. The district court
enjoined the insurers from pursuing the English action.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "duplication
of issues and the insurers' delay in filing the London action
were the sole bases for the district court's injunction ....
[T]hese factors alone did notjustify the breach ofcomity among
the courts of separate sovereignties."' 67
d. In Gau Shan,'68 Plaintiff, Gau Shan, was a cotton merchant
engaged in marketing cotton to the People's Republic of China.
Gau Shan sought to purchase a large amount of American
cotton. Gau Shan arranged financing from Banker's Trust, the
primary financier of the American cotton supplier. As part of
the deal, Banker's Trust required that Gau Shan sign a pro-
missory note containing a forum selection clause, which Gau
Shan did under protest. The American cotton supplier failed to
deliver the contracted amount of cotton and Gau Shan refused
to pay on the promissory note. Banker's Trust advised Gau
Shan in a letter that if the promissory note was not paid it would
file suit in Hong Kong. Without responding, Gau Shan brought
an action in the U.S. seeking rescission of the promissory note,
claiming fraud, deceit and negligence. Gau Shan also sought an
antisuit injunction to prevent a Hong Kong action from
proceeding, arguing that a Hong Kong action would allow
Banker's Trust to gain control of Gau Shan through a
receivership. Such a result, according to Gau Shan, would lead
to a voluntary dismissal of the U.S. case in a way which would
threaten the jurisdiction of the U.S. court.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of an antisuit injunction. The court noted
that threats to jurisdiction are "quite unusual" and that there was
no such threat in this instance.'69 The court observed that "its
jurisdiction was not threatened by the possibility that a ruling of
a foreign court might eventually result in the voluntary dismissal
of the claim before the United States court."' 7 ° Rather than
threatening its jurisdiction, the court found that such a result
166. Compagnie des Bauxites, 651 F.2d 877.
167. Id. at 887.
168. 956 F.2d 1349.
169. Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356.
170. Id.
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would merely threaten Gau Shan's private interest in
prosecuting its claim.
The court then addressed whether there were any attempts
to evade an important public policy, noting that "courts rarely
resort to public policy as a basis for refusing to enforce a
foreign judgment."'' Gau Shan argued that by filing in Hong
Kong, the defendant was seeking to avoid the regulatory effect
of Tennessee's tort statute. The court dismissed this argument
because Gau Shan had pointed only to Tennessee's public
policy and not to any national public policy. The court went on
to reason that "public policies of a state deserve less weight than
public policies of the nation."'72 Finally, the court stated that
"although evasion of an important national policy might
outweigh certain principles of international comity, we question
whether the public policy of one state could ever outweigh those
principles."' 73
e. In a dispute concerning the default on a letter of credit,
Kookmin Bank brought suit in Korea against Hamilton Bank,
located in the United States. 74 Hamilton Bank brought an
action in federal court seeking an injunction enjoining Kookmin
from proceeding with the Korean action. Hamilton Bank
maintained that it lacked minimal contacts with Korea and was
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Korean court.
Hamilton Bank argued that to allow the Korean court to obtain
personal jurisdiction under these circumstances would offend
the principles of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
After examining the means by which personal jurisdiction
is obtained in Korea, the court concluded that an exercise of
personal jurisdiction by the Korean court over Hamilton Bank
would not offend U.S. constitutional principles. The court
denied the antisuit injunction, stating that no compelling public
policy grounds justified overriding principles of international
comity.
f. Berkshire Furniture Co. v. Glatstein:'75 In a copyright dispute,
both plaintiff and defendant claimed ownership of several bed
frame designs under United States law. Defendant also claimed
ownership of the designs in United Kingdom and Malaysian
courts. Plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction to prevent defen-
dant from enforcing its intellectual property rights in Malaysia.
The court denied an injunction on two grounds: the
171. Id. at 1358.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Hamilton Bank N.A. v. Kookmin Bank, 999 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
175. Berkshire Furniture Co. v. Glatistein, 921 F. Supp. 1559 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
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Malaysian litigation posed no threat to its continuing jurisdic-
tion and offended no compelling public policy. First, the court
noted that an intellectual property right cannot be moved from
the court's jurisdictional boundaries, thus depriving the court of
jurisdiction. The court also observed that there had been no
attempt by the defendant to carve out exclusive jurisdiction in
the Malaysian court. In addition, the court found that Malaysian
determination of the validity of the U.K. and Malaysian designs
did not undermine U.S. public policy favoring the protection of
intellectual property of its citizens.
6. Cases GRANTING Antisuit Injunctions Under the Comity Standard
As noted, under the comity standards, antitrust injunctions are issued only
in two situations: i) to protect the U.S. forum's jurisdiction; and ii) to prevent
evasion of important public policies.
a. Foreign Action Threatens the U.S. Court's Jurisdiction. In Mut.
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit lndus. '76 Plaintiff Mutual Service was
an insurer of defendant Frit Industries, a corporation conducting
business in the British Isles. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against
defendant in federal court seeking a determination of the scope
of coverage under the insurance policies. Plaintiff was later
named as a defendant in a counter-claim filed by Frit Industries
in the British Isles and in a cross-claim filed by two other
insurers of Frit Industries in the Cayman Islands.
Plaintiff sought an antisuit injunction enjoining the
proceedings in the British Isles and the Cayman Islands. The
court found that this was a rare instance where there was a
sufficient threat to the court's jurisdiction to justify overriding
the principles of international comity, and granted an antisuit
injunction. Significant to the court's decision was that the
defendants in the British Isles had sought an antisuit injunction
enjoining Mutual Service from continuing the U.S. action. The
court viewed this as an attempt to carve out exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the action. The court, emphasizing that an antisuit
injunction should be no broader than necessary, enjoined the
defendants from seeking to establish the British Isles as the
exclusive forum for the claim, either through injunctive or
declaratory relief.
176. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., 805 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1992), aff'd per curiam,
3 F.3d 442 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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b. Evasion of Important Public Policies. In Farrell Lines Inc. v.
Columbus Cello-Poly Corp.'77 Plaintiff, Farrell Lines, operated
a merchant vessel which was involved in an accident while
delivering cargo in Norfolk, Virginia. As a result of this
accident the cargo suffered $800,000 of damage. After an
exchange of correspondence concerning insurance settlement,
plaintiff Farrell Lines filed suit in the Southern District of New
York, the jurisdiction specified in a forum selection clause. The
court issued a declaratoryjudgment ofnonliability in plaintiff's
favor. Farell Lines also sought an antisuit injunction preventing
defendants from filing or prosecuting a suit related to the
damaged cargo in any other forum, including Italy, where suit
was pending.
Applying the comity standard for determining antisuit
injunctions, the court found that defendants in this case had sued
in a foreign forum to evade two important public policies. The
court determined that the defendants had filed suit in Italy to
avoid the U.S. policy favoring enforcement of forum selection
clauses. In addition, the court found that the defendants sued in
Italy to evade the contractual liability limitation provisions.
Finally, the court noted that since it had already granted a
declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff, there was less
justification for permitting litigation in a foreign court.'78
D. Vexatiousness Standard
1. Basic Principles
a. U.S. courts that have adopted the vexatiousness standard for
granting antisuit injunctions are more likely to grant them than
those that have adopted a comity standard.
b. A court operating under the vexatiousness standard will issue
an antisuit injunction if allowing the foreign proceeding to go
forward would
i) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction;
ii) be vexatious or oppressive;
iii) threaten the issuing court's jurisdiction; and
iv) result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency or
race to judgment.'79
177. Farrell Lines Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd
sub nom Farrell Lines Inc. v. Ceres Terminals Inc., 161 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
178. See also Int 7 Fashion Prods., B. V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., 1995 WL 92321 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1995) (enjoining foreign suit filed in violation of forum selection clause).
179. See Seattle Totems, 652 F. 2d at 855.
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2. Cases DENYING An Antisuit Injunction Under the
Vexatiousness Standard
a. In Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd.,' Plaintiff,
Robinson, was a California citizen and a former employee of
defendant, Jardine Insurance, an English corporation. Robinson
resigned from employment with defendant and allegedly began
to solicit defendant's colleagues and clients in violation of a
non-compete clause. The defendant obtained a temporary
restraining order in England enjoining Robinson from com-
peting with his former employer. Robinson sought an antisuit
injunction to prevent the defendant from enforcing the
temporary restraining order issued by the English court.
The district court for the Northern District of California,
following the vexatiousness standard, granted an antisuit injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant from enforcing the English
temporary restraining order in the United States, but not
precluding the defendants from enforcing it in England. The
court reasoned that the English order frustrated California's
public policy disfavoring unreasonable restrictions on lawful
competition. The court noted, however, that under the
principles of international comity, it would defer to the English
court's injunction preventing plaintiff from competing against
his former employer in England.
b. In Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara,'81 the Fifth Circuit considered the issue
of whether or not to grant an antisuit injunction in connection
with a proceeding to enforce a Swiss arbitration award in the
United States.
Karaha Bodas Company ("KBC"), a power company,
entered into two contracts with the defendant ("Pertamina" an
energy company wholly owned by the Indonesian government)
to construct a power plant in Indonesia. The contract contained
a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate any disputes in
Switzerland under the UNCITRAL rules. Following a dispute
between the parties, KBC initiated arbitration proceedings in
Switzerland, and, following a hearing, the arbitration panel
ruled in favor ofKBC, awarding it damages of over $260 million.
Immediately after the award was rendered, Pertamina
sought to vacate it in the Swiss courts. While that proceeding
180. Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int 'Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.Cal. 1994).
181. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. 2003).
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was pending, KBC commenced proceedings in the district court
for the Southern District of Texas to confirm the award pursuant
to the New York Convention. Pertamina defended and also
moved to stay the U.S. proceedings pending the outcome of the
Swiss proceedings. While the district court declined to stay the
proceedings, it agreed to slow the proceedings in deference to
Pertamina's request. After the Swiss court dismissed
Pertamina's action, the district court granted KBC's motion for
summary judgment enforcing the award.
Shortly thereafter, Pertamina began proceedings to vacate
the award in the Indonesian courts and also sought there an
injunction and penalties to enjoin KBC from enforcing the
award in the United States. Just days before the hearing
scheduled by the Indonesian court on the proposed injunction,
KBC sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin
Pertamina from seeking injunctive relief in Indonesia. The
district court issued a TRO ordering Pertamina to withdraw its
application to the Indonesian court for an injunction and
enjoining it from taking any substantive steps in that court.
Pertamina claimed it did not have sufficient time to withdraw its
request for injunctive relief, and the Indonesian court issued an
injunction prohibiting KBC from enforcing the award. KBC
filed a motion asking the district court to hold Pertamina in
contempt for violating the TRO. The district court found KBC
in contempt of the TRO, again ordered Pertamina to withdraw
its Indonesian application for injunctive reliefagainst KBC, and
ordered Pertamina to indemnify KBC for any fines resulting
from the Indonesian injunction. KBC next asked the district
court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Pertamina from
enforcing the Indonesian injunction and from further pursuing
the annulment action in Indonesia. Pertamina responded by
filing a motion to purge the contempt order. The district court
granted KBC's motion for a preliminary injunction-enjoining
Pertamina from enforcing the Indonesian injunction and from
taking any substantive steps to prosecute the Indonesian
annulment action. The court also denied Pertamina's motion to
purge contempt. Pertamina appealed.
The Fifth Circuit had to deal with two issues on appeal.
First, did the New York Convention preclude the district court
from issuing an antisuit injunction? Second, assuming the
district court could, consistent with the New York Convention,
issue an antisuit injunction, was it appropriate for the court to
have exercised its discretion to do so?
Pertamina argued that the New York Convention prevented
a district court from exercising its inherent power to issue an
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antisuit injunction. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view on the
ground that nothing in the Convention or the implementing
legislation limited the power of a federal court to issue an
antisuit injunction:
Although these treaty obligations limit the grounds on
which the court can refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award,
there is nothing in the Convention or implementing legislation
that expressly limits the inherent authority of a federal court to
grant injunctive relief with respect to a party over whom it has
jurisdiction. Given the absence of an express provision, we
discern no authority for holding that the New York Convention
divests the district court of its inherent authority to issue an
antisuit injunction.'82
The court then turned to the question of whether it was
appropriate for the district court to have exercised its discretion
to issue an antisuit injunction in the circumstances of the case.
As noted, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the "vexatious and
oppressive" standard for antisuit injunctions. Under this
standard, in determining whether to issue an antisuit injunction,
courts look to such factors as whether the foreign lawsuit will
lead to delay, expense or inefficiency, whether the foreign
lawsuit is duplicative, or whether it threatens the U.S. court's
jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in issuing
an antisuit injunction, reaching this conclusion by examining the
U.S. and Indonesian proceedings in the context of the New
York Convention.
Central to the Fifth Circuit's analysis was that the New
York Convention distinguished between courts of "primary
jurisdiction" and courts of"secondaryjurisdiction." A court of
primary jurisdiction is one with the authority to set aside an
arbitral award. The courts of the country whose arbitration laws
apply to the case, typically the country of the arbitral situs, are
those of primary jurisdiction. The New York Convention is
silent on the grounds on which a court of primary jurisdiction
may rely to set aside an award, such that the issue turns on the
domestic law of that country. A court of secondary jurisdiction
is one with the authority to confirm an arbitral award. Article
V of the New York Convention sets forth the exclusive grounds
on which the court may refuse to confirm an arbitral award.
Moreover, petitions to confirm an arbitral award can be brought
in more than one court of secondary jurisdiction. As a result,
"[b]y allowing concurrent enforcement and annulment actions,
182. Id. at 365.
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as well as simultaneous enforcement actions in third countries,
the Convention necessarily envisions multiple proceedings that
address the same substantive challenges to an arbitral award."' 83
In seeking an antisuit injunction, one central argument
advanced by KBC was that the Indonesian court was not a court
of primary jurisdiction, and, therefore, did not have the
authority to annul the award. The Fifth Circuit did not
necessarily disagree with KBC's assertion that the Indonesian
court did not have primary jurisdiction.84
The Fifth Circuit held, however, that it did not have to
reach the issue of whether or not Indonesia was a court of
primary jurisdiction. "To resolve the instant dispute, however,
it is not necessary for us to address the Indonesian court's
decision to issue its own injunction and to entertain an
annulment action under the Convention."' 5 Rather, it found
that "[s]everal structural aspects of the New York Convention
indicate that none of the factors that usually contribute to
vexatiousness and oppressiveness are at play here."'8 6
First, the court relied on the fact that the New York
Convention permits simultaneous proceedings-both in a court
of primary jurisdiction to vacate an award and in the courts of
secondary jurisdictions to confirm an award. Since "the Con-
vention already provides for multiple simultaneous proceedings,
it is difficult to envision how court proceedings in Indonesia
could amount to an inequitable hardship."'8 7
Second, the court found that "there is little evidence that the
Indonesian injunction or annulment action will 'frustrate and
delay the speedy and efficient determination of the case."" 8
The court noted in this context that a U.S. court can enforce an
arbitral award even if it has been annulled in a country with
primary jurisdiction.8 9 Thus, the fact that there was an
annulment proceeding in Indonesia would result in only a
"slight additional expenditure ofjudicial resources."' 90 This is
183. Id. at 367.
184. Id. at 371 ("We agree that there is strong evidence in this instance favoring Switzerland as the
paramount country of primary jurisdiction under the Convention."). See also id. at 373 ("It is true that
Pertamina is likely in the wrong here, and that Indonesia's injunction and annulment may violate comity and
the spirit of the Convention much more than would the district court's injunction.").
185. Id. at 366.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 368.
188. Id. at 369.
189. Id. at 370 (citing ChromalloyAeroservs. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 907,909-13
(D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing an arbitral award rendered in Egypt notwithstanding annulment in Egypt)).
190. Id. at 370.
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because a U.S. court called upon to confirm an arbitral award
would have to undertake some analysis to decide whether or not
to do so regardless of whether there were annulment proceed-
ings elsewhere, and the additional resources devoted to
determine whether to confirm an award notwithstanding its
annulment by another court would be "inconsequential."''
Third, the issues in the Indonesian case (an action to set
aside the arbitral award) were not identical to those in the U.S.
case (an action to confirm the award). This is because, as noted,
an action to set aside an award is governed by the domestic law
of the country in which the action is brought (i.e., Indonesian
law), whereas an action to confirm an award is governed by the
Convention. "Thus, assuming arguendo that the Indonesian
courts might somehow be deemed to be courts of primary juris-
diction, they still would not precisely duplicate the enforcement
proceedings that took place in the United States."'92
Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Indonesian
court proceedings "do not threaten the integrity of the district
court's jurisdiction or its judgment enforcing the Award....
Thus, the integrity ofourjurisdiction will not be affected unless
we decide that the Indonesian annulment is in fact valid andthat
this annulment outweighs the Swiss court's confirmation of the
Award.' 93 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this last point is
questionable as the Indonesian court was not only considering
whether or not to annul the arbitral award, but also had entered
an antisuit injunction enjoining KBC from enforcing the award.
It was an injunction such as this one that the Laker Airways
court found was a threat to its jurisdiction. An antisuit
injunction/although it is aimed at a party to a lawsuit rather than
a foreign court/does have the effect of depriving the foreign
court of jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit did not ignore the effect of the antisuit
injunction on KBC itself, stating:
... as a court of secondary jurisdiction under the New York
Convention, charged only with enforcing or refusing to enforce
a foreign arbitral award, it is not the district court's burden or
ours to protect KBC from all the legal hardships it might
undergo in a foreign country as a result of this foreign
arbitration or the international commercial dispute that spawned
i.194it.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 370.
193. Id. at 370.
194. Id. at 369.
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However, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider that those
"legal hardships"/which may include a fine for contempt of
court/can have the effect of compelling a party to U.S.
proceedings to curtail its action in the U.S., which has the
corollary of depriving the U.S. court ofjurisdiction.
Against the vexations of the Indonesian proceedings, the
court balanced considerations of international comity. Signifi-
cant to its analysis was that allowing the antisuit injunction to
stand "could set an undesirable precedent under the [New York]
Convention, permitting a secondary jurisdiction to impose
penalties on a party when it disagrees with that party's attempt
to challenge an award in another country."' 95
3. Cases GRANTING an Antisuit Injunction
Under the Vexatiousness Standard
a. Kaepa involved a contract between Kaepa, a U.S. athletic shoe
manufacturer, and Achilles, a Japanese corporation which
agreed to distribute Kaepa's footwear in Japan. 196 The contract
explicitly provided that Texas law and the English language
would govern its interpretation, that it would be enforceable in
Texas, and that Achilles consented to the jurisdiction of the
Texas courts. There arose a dispute, and Kaepa filed suit in
Texas. After about a year, during which time discovery had
occurred in the Texas suit, Achilles filed suit in Japan.
Kaepa sought an antisuit injunction from the Texas court
asking it to enjoin Achilles from prosecuting its suit in Japan.
Achilles responded by moving to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds. The lower court denied Achilles' motion
to dismiss and granted Kaepa's motion to enjoin.
Achilles appealed and sought to persuade the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to adopt the comity standard. The
court rejected that standard, declining "to require a district court
to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity
every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign
action.""' 9 Rather, the court found that an antisuit injunction
was warranted because prosecution of the Japanese action
would be considerably duplicative and would result in
unwarranted inconvenience, expense, and vexation.
195. Id. at 373.
196. Kaepa Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. Id. at 627.
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b. In Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys.,19 Bull Data
Systems ("BDS"), a French computer manufacturer, negotiated
an insurance agreement with Allendale, an American insurance
company. The insurance policy, covering BDS' French loca-
tions, was negotiated under the French insurance code. After a
suspected arson destroyed a warehouse full of BDS inventory,
a dispute arose regarding the scope of Allendale's insurance
coverage. Pending a criminal investigation into the possible
arson, Allendale refused to indemnify BDS and instead filed an
action in the Northern District of Illinois. BDS commenced suit
in the commercial court of France, a court of limited juris-
diction. Allendale petitioned the district court to enjoin the
French proceedings, arguing that the French court, due to its
limited jurisdiction, was not equipped to resolve the arson issue,
which was an essential component of the insurance dispute.
The district court granted the antisuit injunction after
determining that the U.S. court was a more appropriate forum
to resolve the entire dispute. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of the antisuit injunction after
cautioning that it would be improper to consider the relative
merits of the French and American procedural systems. The
court pointed to the vexatiousness and "absurd duplication of
effort" that would arise out of allowing both actions to
proceed.'"
The court went on to discuss the importance of inter-
national comity. While international comity was a relevant
factor, the court emphasized that it would not presume a threat
to comity without evidence of such a threat. The court then
suggested that such evidence of a threat to foreign relations
could be presented by a representation from the State Depart-
ment or an appropriate foreign body. The court compared the
comity standard to the vexatiousness standard:
The strict cases [those following the comity standard]
presume a threat to international comity whenever an injunction
is sought against litigating in a foreign court. The lax cases
[those following the vexatiousness standard] want to see some
empirical flesh on the theoretical skeleton. They do not deny
that comity could be impaired by such an injunction but they
demand evidence.., that comity is likely to be impaired in this
case.
200
198. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 431.
200. Id.
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c. In Seattle Totems,0' the owners of the Seattle Totems, an ice
hockey team in the now defunct Western Hockey League,
brought a private antitrust action in federal district court against
the National Hockey League, Northwest Sports, and various
other league officers and club owners claiming unlawful
monopolization ofthe ice hockey industry in North America and
seeking to have certain agreements relating to the sale and
management of the Seattle Totems declared void and
unenforceable. Northwest Sports commenced suit in Canada
with respect to the same agreements that were the subject of the
U.S. action. Plaintiff moved for an antisuit injunction in the
U.S. court to enjoin Northwest Sports from pursuing its contract
claim in Canada.
Following the vexatiousness standard, the Ninth Circuit
issued the antisuit injunction after finding that adjudicating the
contract issue in two separate actions would result in
unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense
to the parties and the witnesses. The court expressed concern
that separate adjudication could result in inconsistent rulings or
a race to judgment. 2 2 The court also found that the claim
brought by defendants in the foreign jurisdiction was in fact a
compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure
13(a) which should be adjudicated where the original claim was
brought.2"3 The court concluded that policies favoring conven-
ience to the parties and witnesses, the interest in efficient
administration of justice, the potential prejudice to the parties,
and the rationale behind Rule 13(a) weighed in favor of granting
the antisuit injunction.
d. Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.2"" A Minnesota
company brought suit against two insurers seeking to recover
losses incurred by an English affiliate. One of the insurers
brought suit against plaintiff Cargill in England to determine the
scope of insurance coverage. The district court, without dis-
cussing principles of international comity, granted plaintiff's
motion for an antisuit injunction. The court based the injunction
on the grounds that it would be vexatious to Cargill and a waste
of judicial resources to require adjudication in two separate
forums. The court also expressed concern about the risk of pre-
judice to plaintiff from possible inconsistent results and a race
to judgment.
201. Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d 852.
202. Id. at 856.
203. Id. at 854.
204. Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982).
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E. Totality of the Circumstances
1. The First Circuit's Decision
a. The Facts: Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Bedriyfsrevisoren arose out of an audit engagement undertaken
by a Belgian accounting firm-Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren ("KPMG-B")--on behalf of
Lemout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V. ("L&H"). °5 After
L&H collapsed, several securities fraud actions were com-
menced in the U.S. against KPMG-B. These cases were con-
solidated before the district court for the District of
Massachusetts. KPMG-B did not dispute that it was subject to
personal jurisdiction in the U.S., although it unsuccessfully
moved to dismiss the suits on grounds offorum non conveniens
and the failure to satisfy the pleading requirements of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
After KPMG-B's motion was denied, plaintiffs served
document requests on KPMG-B for its audit records and work
papers. KPMG-B refused to produce them, asserting that to do
so would violate Belgian law. Plaintiffs moved to compel, and
the district court granted that motion. In response, KPMG-B
sought relief from the Belgian courts. Specifically, KPMG-B
filed an ex parte petition with a court in Brussels seeking to
enjoin the plaintiffs in the U.S. action from"tak[ing] any step of
a procedural or other nature in order to proceed with the
discovery procedure." To ensure compliance, KPMG-B also
asked the Belgian court to impose a fine of one million Euros
for each violation of the proposed injunction.
The Belgian court refused to act ex parte. Instead, it
required KPMG-B to give notice of the Belgian proceedings to
the plaintiffs in the U.S. litigation, and it scheduled a hearing.
Before that hearing took place, the plaintiffs in the U.S.
proceedings sought an anti-suit injunction from the U.S. court
enjoining KPMG-B from pursuing the proceedings in Belgium.
The district court granted the injunction. KPMG-B
appealed. The First Circuit issued a partial stay of the injunc-
tion (permitting KPMG-B to appear at the hearing in Brussels
for the sole purpose of asking for a continuance), and expedited
the appeal. The First Circuit dealt with two basic issues on
appeal: the standards for appellate review of a district court's
order on an international anti-suit injunction and the standards
205. Quaakv. KlynveldPeat Marwick GoerdelerBedrijfsrevisoren, No. 03-2704,2004 WL 415282
(I st Cir. Mar. 8, 2004).
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a district court should use in deciding whether or not to issue
such an injunction.
b. Standard of Review: While the First Circuit acknowledged that
the grant of preliminary injunctions, as a general matter, should
receive "deferential review" on appeal, the court noted that
because international anti-suit injunctions involve "important
considerations of comity," they warrant "a heightened level of
appellate review." This review is more rigorous than the abuse
of discretion or clear error standard, but involves less scrutiny
than de novo review. "Given our chosen standard of review, we
cede a modest degree of deference to the trier's exercise of
discretion, but we will not hesitate to act upon our independent
judgment if it appears a mistake has been made."
c. Standard for Anti-Suit Injunction: In addressing the appropriate
standard for issuing an anti-suit injunction, the court rejected the
liberal approach because it assigned "too low a priority" to
international comity. And although it found that the conserva-
tive approach "has more to commend it," the First Circuit
"stop[ped] short ... of an uncritical acceptance" of it.
Instead, the First Circuit adopted a third position. It stated
that considerations of international comity "ordinarily establish
a rebuttable presumption against the issuance of an order that
has the effect of halting foreign judicial proceedings." The
court made it clear, however, that, contrary to the conservative
approach, it did not believe that the circumstances in which that
presumption could be overcome should be limited to two
grounds-threat to jurisdiction and public policy. Rather the
court instructed district courts to examine "the totality of the
circumstances" in deciding whether the presumption against the
issuance of an anti-suit injunction had been overcome. These
circumstances "include (but are by no means limited to) such
things as: the nature of the two actions (i.e., whether they are
merely parallel or whether the foreign action is more properly
classified as interdictory); the posture of the proceedings in the
two countries; the conduct of the parties (including their good
faith or lack thereof); the importance of the policies at stake in
the litigation; and, finally, the extent to which the foreign action
has the potential to undermine the forum court's ability to reach
a just and speedy result."
Having articulated a new standard, the court went on to
apply it to the case before it, and found that the district court
was justified in issuing the anti-suit injunction.
d. Applying The New Standard: The First Circuit characterized
the KMPG-B's Belgian action as one seeking "to arrest the
progress of the securities fraud action by thwarting the very
[Vol. 14:2
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discovery that the district court, which is intimately familiar
with the exigencies of the underlying case, has deemed essential
to the continued prosecution of the action against any of the
defendants." While KPMG-B's Belgian action did "not con-
stitute a frontal assault on the district court's jurisdiction," its
effect was the same. A "court has a right-indeed, a duty-to
preserve its ability to do justice between the parties in cases that
are legitimately before it." Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of the anti-suit injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine and strategies discussed in this article are critical to parties
involved in international litigation who wish to secure the most favorable forum
for an action.
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VII. APPENDIX A
DRAFT FORUM SELECTION AND RELATED CLAUSES
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Forum
i. Exclusive Forum
The courts of [Country X] shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions relating to or arising out of
this Agreement.
ii. Non-Exclusive Forum
The courts of [Country X] shall have jurisdiction to decide
all actions relating to or arising out of this Agreement,
without prejudice to the right of either party to commence
such actions in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
iii. Asymmetrical Forum Selection Clause
The parties agree that all actions arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X], provided
however, that [Party A] shall be also free to commence
such actions in any court of competent jurisdiction,
including without limitation the courts of [Country Y] and
[Country Z].
iv. Defendant's Place of Business As Forum
Any suit relating to this Agreement brought by [Party A]
shall be brought in the place where [Party B's] principal
place of business is located; any suit relating to this
Agreement brought by [Party B] shall be brought in the
place where [Party A's] principal place of business is
located.
v. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
N.B. In the United States, because a party cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court, a party
should provide that either the state or federal courts of that
state shall have jurisdiction. For example:
The state and federal courts of New York shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions relating to or arising
out of the Agreement.
2. Scope of Clause
i. Broad Scope
All disputes, claims, controversies, and disagreements
relating to or arising out of this Agreement, or the subject
matter of this Agreement, shall be subject to the exclusive




All disputes relating to this Agreement, with the exception
of claims arising under Article 1II, shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X].
3. Other Common Provisions
i. Consent to Service of Process
[Party A] irrevocably designates, appoints and empowers
[Agent D], with offices on the date hereof at [Address in
City E], as its agent with respect to any action or
proceeding in [Country X] to receive, on its behalf, and in
respect of its property, service of any and all legal process,
summons, notices and documents which may be served in
any such action or proceeding, and agrees that the failure
of the agent to notify [Party A] of any such service of
process does not impair or affect the validity of service.
[Party A] further irrevocably consents to the service of
process out of any of the courts listed in [Article II] by the
mailing of copies by registered or certified mail, postage
prepaid, to [Party A] at its address set forth in [Article III],
such service to become effective 30 days after such
mailing. If for any reason [Party A] shall cease to be
available to act as agent, [Agent D] agrees to designate a
new agent in [City E] on the same terms and for the same
purposes.
ii. Waiver of Foreign Sovereign or State Immunity
[Party A] is subject to civil and commercial law with
respect to its obligations under this Agreement. The
execution, delivery and performance by [Party A] of this
Agreement constitute private and commercial acts rather
than public or governmental acts. Neither [Party A], nor
any of its properties or revenues, is entitled to or will
claim any right of immunity in any jurisdiction from suit,
jurisdiction,judgment, attachment (whether before or after
judgment), set-off or execution of ajudgment or from any
other legal process or remedy relating to the obligations of
[Party A] under this Agreement.
iii. Choice-of-Law Clauses
a. Scope of Choice-of-Law Clause
This agreement shall be interpreted in accordance
with, and governed by, the laws of [Country X]. OR
This agreement shall be construed in accordance
with the laws of [Country X]. OR
This Agreement will be governed by, and all
disputes relating to or arising out of this Agreement
[or the subject matter of this Agreement] shall be
2008]
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resolved in accordance with, the laws of [Country
X].
b. Renvoi Versus "Whole Law"
This Agreement will be governed by, and all
disputes relating to or arising out of this Agreement
shall be resolved in accordance with, the laws of
[Country X] (to the exclusion of its conflict of laws
rules).
iv. Waiver of Forum Non Conveniens
Each party waives any right to invoke, and agrees not to
invoke, any claim of forum non conveniens, inconvenient
forum, or transfer or change of venue.
v. Waiver of Jury Trial
[Party A] expressly waives any right to a trial by jury with
respect to disputes relating to this Agreement, and agrees
not to seek or claim any such right.
vi. Application of Forum Selection Clauses to Actions
Seeking Provisional or Interim Relief
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either party from
applying to a court that would otherwise have jurisdiction
for provisional or interim measures, including but not
limited to any claim for preliminary injunctive relief. OR
All disputes relating to this Agreement shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X], provided that
claims alleging unlicensed or otherwise unauthorized use
of the [Trademarks] may be asserted in any court of
competent jurisdiction. OR
All disputes relating to this Agreement (with the exception
of claims arising under Article X) shall be resolved
exclusively in the courts of [Country X].
vii. Basic Forum Selection Clause
All disputes relating to this Agreement shall be subject to
the exclusivejurisdiction ofthe courts of[Country X], and
shall be decided in accordance with the laws of [Country
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